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eDitorS’ note

O

ver the past fifty years, international trade and investment has grown considerably and connected country
economies worldwide. So too have the legal frameworks created to coordinate such activity: from the creation of
the first bilateral investment treaty in 19591 to the more than
2,700 in existence today,2 the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) in 1995, and over 200 regional trade
agreements currently in force.3 While much attention focused
on international trade and investment starting in 2008, as the
U.S. financial crisis led to a global trade collapse, impacts of
international trade and investment outside of the economic
realm, in particular on sustainable development, are growing in
recognition. Countries are beginning to integrate environmental standards into free trade and international investment agreements, the WTO and United Nations Environment Programme
collaborated on a trade and climate change report,4 the World
Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation released its
revised Sustainability Framework for private sector development projects in May 2011, and after the 2007-2008 surge in
food prices and resulting private purchases of land in developing countries, concerns of “land grabbing” have been raised.
Articles in this issue on Trade, Investment, and Sustainable
Development review some of the deficiencies and imbalances
of existing trade and investment agreements while proposing solutions to help counter and mitigate these issues. One
author focuses on the issues concerning the health, safety, and
environmental measures and whether the non-discrimination
standards in investment treaties require consideration of these
measures. Another author reviews the issues pertaining to the
U.S. trade policy and how it can be used to advance global food
security goals as opposed to hindering them. Next, an article
analyzes the often highly secretive and confidential foreign
investment contracts in the oil and gas sector, with a focus on
the environmentally relevant clauses in these contracts. While
another article addresses measures being taken to strengthen
environmental and social sustainability in China’s overseas
investments and considers whether Chinese institutions could
learn from other institutions. Lastly, an article reviews the

FeaTures:
14 | the lurking coStS oF green technology
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by Winfield J. Wilson

21 | global traDe: the impact oF maSSachuSettS’
energy policy on columbia’S mining inDuStry
by Cynthia Wildfire

27 | Small winD turbineS may change the Future
oF energy in Developing countrieS
by Robert Foster

feasibility of border tax adjustments designed to reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions and how they might conflict with
existing WTO multilateral rules.
With the WTO’s Doha Development Round stalled and
the world’s economies struggling to resume growth, we must
remember that although international trade and investment
is an integral part of the global economy, it is a mere subset
within the overarching goal of sustainable development. This
issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy seeks to contribute to the understanding of important developments in
international trade and investment and encourage further integration of sustainable development principles into existing and
future frameworks. For only with the proper balance and recognition of both the environment and development, and their
connection with trade and investment, can sustainable development be realized.
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Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development:
the

Non-Discrimination Standards

by Marcos Orellana*

T

Introduction

he approach of building mutually supportive trade,
investment, and environmental regimes finds inspiration in the concept of sustainable development. Indeed,
the World Summit on Sustainable Development recognized that
trade and investment are necessary tools for achieving the goals
of sustainable development.1 Economic activities may contribute
to the progressive realization of human rights and environmental protection by fostering economic development, employment,
income generation, and general welfare. This potential contribution is not automatic, however, as non-sustainable investments, or
unwarranted interpretations of trade and investment disciplines,
may defeat such general welfare goals by exposing the population to health risks, causing environmental harm, or reducing the
necessary policy space for sustainable development.
While its exact legal nature and status remain the object of
controversy, at a minimum, sustainable development requires the
integration of environmental issues in decision-making regarding development and investment projects.2 If sustainable development requires the integration of environmental considerations
in the planning and implementation of economic activities, it
follows that the resolution of economic disputes concerning
health, safety, and environmental (“HSE”) measures should also
be integrated into the various fields involved. This process of
integration in dispute settlement places an emphasis on treaty
interpretation and, particularly, an emphasis on the principle of
systemic integration codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.3 In this regard, sustainable development calls
for a process of normative dialogue, and the interpretive principle of systemic integration guides the conversation.
The interpretation and application of substantive investment disciplines carries intense implications for the policy space
available to governments to adopt measures conducive to sustainable development. If compensation by the host government
to the investor is required for the adoption of such measures,
“even where regulatory action is taken in a fair and equitable
manner, the potential cost to the governments may well discourage desirable or necessary environmental regulations.”4 This
general issue is particularly relevant in disputes concerning the
relative non-discrimination standards of most-favored nation
(“MFN”) treatment and national treatment (“NT”) because normal regulatory activity hinges on the construct of categories and
distinctions that underlie differentiated approaches and rules
attaching to particular persons, products, substances, economic
sectors, etc.
3

This paper analyzes key issues concerning the scrutiny of
HSE measures under the non-discrimination standards. It first
introduces the non-discrimination standards and then examines
the thorny questions of discriminatory intent and like circumstances. The paper argues that the construct of relative non-discrimination standards in investment treaties does not incorporate
“necessity” requirements to justify HSE measures, in contrast
to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Instead,
the relative non-discrimination standards of MFN and NT allow
for HSE considerations in their two core operative elements: “in
like circumstances” and “less favorable treatment.”

The Non-Discrimination Standards
The relative non-discrimination standards proscribe discrimination on the basis of nationality. They require treatment
no less favorable than that afforded to other national or foreign
investors “in like circumstances.”5 The comparison of the treatment afforded to similarly situated investors becomes the master
key to the operation of the non-discrimination standards.
Given that the comparison process involves determining
which investors are similarly situated, taking into account all relevant circumstances, the operation of the standards is far from a
mechanical application of a mathematical formula. Instead, the
application of the non-discrimination standards calls for abstract
legal reasoning and involves a measure of subjective assessment.
Because of this, there is a degree of uncertainty involved in their
operation, which may affect the policy space available to States.
Several questions are relevant to the interpretation of nondiscrimination standards through a sustainable development
lens. For example: what is the meaning of “less favorable treatment,” and is it established by disparate impact alone? Does the
meaning of “in like circumstances” allow authorities to differentiate among investors and/or investments on account of the dissimilar HSE threats posed by different substances, production
processes, geographical conditions, etc? If so, does like circumstances operate as an element of the non-discrimination stan-
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Development Law & Policy. Elements of this article are based on prior works,
including: Marcos Orellana, Science, Risk and Uncertainty: Public Health Measures and Investment Disciplines, in New Aspects of International Investment
Law 671 Phillippe Kahn & Thomas Wälde eds., Hague Acad. of Int’l Law, 2007.

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

dards, or as an exception, which would transpose the necessity
test of trade law into the investment regime?
This paper addresses the non-discrimination standards of
MFN and NT together, since the focus of analysis is their relation to HSE measures. In trade law, by contrast, national treatment rationales are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation
of MFN disciplines,6 as MFN and “non-discrimination” are
not necessarily synonymous.7 While differences between MFN
and national treatment may be warranted in the trade regime,
in the investment arena, both MFN and NT operate within the
border with respect to largely similar issues. Both the Occidental case and the Cross Border Trucking case (examined below)
have approached their analysis under the assumption that both
the MFN and NT standards are synonymous, in the investment
context.

Discriminatory Purpose
Actual proof of discriminatory intent is generally not
required as an element of discrimination.8 This does not mean
that the purpose of an HSE measure is irrelevant, however.
Account of purpose allows for proper consideration of the perspectives of both the investor and the State, including the public
interest underlying HSE measures, and thus overcomes unidirectional interpretations that consider investment obligations from
the sole vantage point of the investor.9 Moreover, the purpose of
the challenged measure is relevant since less favorable treatment
is not established by disparate impact alone. In practice, national
treatment claims arguing that any treatment that differentially
affects a foreign investor, even if the difference is not attributable to considerations of nationality, have not been successful.10
If these claims were decided otherwise, the State would find
itself unable to regulate in the public interest, with respect to
processes or substances in a market dominated by foreign investors, without risking international liability, given that HSE measures would inevitably affect economic operators differently.
But how can tribunals determine the real purpose behind a
measure? And, how should tribunals address situations of mixed
intent, i.e., situations where a legitimate HSE objective co-exists
with an impermissible motive? The difficulties involved in identifying regulatory purpose are compounded in the modern regulatory State, where legislatures and administrations respond to a
number of often-competing interests, and where so much economic and social activity is highly regulated. In light of the fact
that States are hardly monolithic entities, the determination of
protectionist purpose may become a formidable challenge to a
discrimination claim or defense. The Methanex Tribunal, hearing an arbitration involving groundwater contamination in California, aptly expressed the problem:
In particular, decrees and regulations may be the product of compromises and the balancing of competing
interests by a variety of political actors. As a result, it
may be difficult to identify a single or predominant purpose underlying a particular measure. Where a single
governmental actor is motivated by an improper purpose, it does not necessarily follow that the motive can
Spring 2011

be attributed to the entire government. Much if not all
will depend on the evidential materials adduced in the
particular case.11
Several observations may be warranted in respect to the
difficulties involved in identifying and proving intent. First,
although in international law States may be said to express but
one voice, democracies in practice respond to different, often
competing, political interests. This political feature of democracy is not to be condemned, especially when international law
recognizes that democracy, human rights, and development are
“interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”12 It may well be that
different purposes co-exist and explain why a given measure was
adopted.
In such cases, issues of mixed intent will introduce severe
tensions between economic and HSE considerations. In this
regard, once evidence reveals the existence of HSE risks, the
parallel presence of illicit protectionist intent in some governmental organ should not ipso facto render a measure illegal.
If HSE risks are real, then the HSE protective purpose should
in principle prevail over other purposes, given the paramount
importance of safeguarding health, safety, and the environment.
Second, HSE measures cannot be presumed to be discriminatory. On the contrary, where national authorities have applied
due process and based their findings of risks and determination
of the level of protection on the basis of available scientific evidence, the specificity of HSE measures warrants qualified deference. It is for the claimant to prove discriminatory treatment, and
not incumbent upon the government to demonstrate its public
purpose. That said, the “smell test,” discussed below, the uncertainties as to the location of the threshold involved in making a
prima facie case, and the dangers of negative inferences should
lead cautious governments to be forthcoming in adducing evidence demonstrating the legitimacy of their HSE measures.
With regard to the evidence underlying a HSE measure, the
country of origin of the scientific evidence is not necessarily a
material reason for either accepting or rejecting it.13 The origin
of the scientific evidence cannot sustain a presumption of discriminatory intent because if it could, then most governments
would risk attracting international responsibility for their efforts
in assessing risks. Furthermore, the level of detail or specificity required of the scientific evidence underlying HSE measures
needs to take into account real world considerations and the substantial costs involved in producing a science-based analysis of
the risks presented by the multiple substances, processes, and
activities that interact in society. The burden on developing countries of producing tailored and specific scientific studies, in light
of their limited budget for scientific research and more pressing
priorities such as sanitation and food security, illustrates the tensions surrounding the role of science in investment law.14
Third, in facing the challenges involved in determining protectionist intent, especially when considering facially neutral
measures, tribunals are often tempted to adopt a “smell-test.”15
The degree of circumstantial evidence pointing to protectionist intent may acquire a critical role, especially where direct
evidence is unavailable. Thus, claimants will be drawn to
4

statements from different interests groups active in the political
arena, figures on the expected benefits accruing to competitors
in the marketplace, statements and memos from public officials,
and any other piece of evidence that may serve to raise doubts
as to the legitimacy of purpose. In S.D. Myers, which involved
a ban on the export of hazardous PCB waste from Canada to
the United States, the “smoking gun” tactic proved effective in
convincing the tribunal that at stake was not a legitimate HSE
measure, but rather a sham cover for protectionist purposes.16 In
the Methanex case, the claimant even hired a private investigator
to inspect the garbage of ethanol lobbying firms and to trespass
into their offices.17
Fourth, resort to consistency and necessity could also provide indirect evidence of governmental intent. Such indirect
evidence, however, only offers limited assistance because of the
specific nature of HSE measures as well as the absence of actual
obligations for consistency or necessity. Most often governments
regulate in response to public perception of threats as they arise,
and as scientific progress reveals what were until then “invisible”
risks. Also, sustainable development calls for adaptive management and evolving norms in order to incorporate new scientific
insights and lessons learned regarding the operation and effectiveness of legal tools. Thus, requiring overall consistency in
levels of protection and attaching liability for failure to achieve
consistency would have the law operate in fictitious conditions.
The parallel between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(“SPS”)18 of the WTO illustrates the different roles of harmonization and consistency requirements in the trade and investment regimes. The protection of health in a society via sanitary
measures that impede market access for goods that pose SPS
risks will normally impose costs on other countries; to address
this situation and secure market access to foreign goods, the SPS
Agreement pursues harmonization of standards and even presumes conformity when international standards are utilized. 19
Investors and their investments, by contrast, are fully immersed
in the diversity of national and local regulatory requirements,
and it would have been quite far-reaching indeed if international
investment agreements (“IIAs”) pursued harmonization of HSE
standards across legal cultures and across differing levels of
development.
With respect to necessity requirements, could less-trade
restrictive alternatives provide indirect evidence of protectionist intent? In addressing this question, it must first be noted that
the prerogative of countries to establish their levels of protection
stems from their sovereignty, expressed in constitutional mandates to safeguard fundamental rights and to protect the population, inter alia, from HSE risks and that these duties cannot be
surrendered or abandoned.20 Second, countries are not obligated
to justify their measures on the basis of necessity, absent explicit,
conventional commitments to that effect. Third, any inquiry on
less-trade restrictive alternatives should consider that reasonably
available measures should achieve the same level of protection,
involve the same regulatory costs, and restrict trade significantly
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less. Fourth, the textual differences between the SPS Agreement, which explicitly refers to necessity,21 on the one hand, and
non-discrimination disciplines in investment agreements, which
do not usually include such requirement, on the other, must be
given effect.
Fifth and perhaps decisively, in WTO law the remedy for a
measure that offends the less-trade restrictive standard is cessation, i.e., removal of the offending measure and adoption of
the reasonably available less-trade restrictive measure.22 By contrast, investment treaties contemplate monetary damages as the
remedy of choice, which highlights the need to avoid automatic
transposition of trade law into the investment field. Thus, lesstrade restrictive criteria as indirect evidence is of limited value
and could not by itself render sufficient light on illicit motive.
Therefore, arbitral tribunals inclined to employ less-trade
restrictive criteria as indirect evidence should be careful not
to transform them into a substantive necessity requirement. In
claims involving trade and investment issues, the importation of
a necessity test could involve investment arbitration adjudicating trade law claims, in excess of jurisdiction. Further, importing
a necessity test into the non-discrimination standards in investment law would intrude much further into the regulatory autonomy of host States and potentially “lead to odd results.”23
Finally, with respect to “less favorable treatment,” the purpose of a science-based HSE measure should prevail over NT
or MFN claims, including de facto discrimination. A claimant
alleging disguised protectionism in HSE measures will need
to submit compelling evidence proving that the science is a
sham, that no HSE risk exists, or that the government is operating solely for protectionist purposes. Admittedly, this is a high
threshold. Still, the alternative could allow successful challenges
to legitimate HSE measures, thereby compromising the abilities
of governments to fulfill their environmental and human rights
obligations.

Like Circumstances and Non-Discrimination
As the UN International Law Commission observed, even
absent explicit reference to “like circumstances” or “like situations,” such comparative context is implicit in the essence of the
MFN clause.24 The operation of “like circumstances” is not an
easy task, however, given the elasticity of the terms and, thus,
its ability to cast too wide or too narrow a net, depending on the
level of abstraction or detail.
The application of non-discrimination standards raises difficulties where, as a result of local environmental conditions or
the structure of a specific market, the operator that is treated or
affected differently by the HSE measure is also a foreign investor. A hypothetical example presented by the United States Trade
Representative in the context of the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) clarifies the point:
One concern which was raised was the possibility that
measures entirely consistent with MFN and national
treatment may provide differing treatment to investors
depending on the particular circumstance. For example,
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a foreign investor whose investment is situated on a
wetland may legitimately be treated differently than
another foreign or domestic investor due to the location of the investment, rather than the nationality of the
investor. To address this issue, we included language in
our proposal that would clarify the MAI’s definition of
“in like circumstances,” in order to ensure that legitimate environmental measures will not be challenged
purely on the grounds of such differential treatment.25
The application of the non-discrimination standards to HSE
measures raise at least two intertwined questions concerning the
operation of the phrase “in like circumstances.” First, whether
like circumstances operates as an exception to non-discrimination disciplines or alternatively as an operative element of the
MFN and NT standards. Second, whether like circumstances
refer only to operators in the same economic sector or whether
it includes other differentiating criteria. In addition to these two
questions, it remains open to question whether like circumstances could otherwise safeguard HSE measures that by design
differentiate between investors on the basis of nationality.

Like Circumstances: An Operative Element or an
Exception?
Investment jurisprudence is divided as to whether “like
circumstances” constitutes an operative element of the non-discrimination standards or an exception that could justify differential treatment on policy grounds. Analysis of the Cross-Border
Trucking case, concerning U.S. restrictions on cross-border
trucking services as well as restrictions on Mexican investment
in the U.S. trucking industry, is useful in approaching this issThe
NT and MFN issues before the Cross-Border Trucking NAFTA
Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel turned on the meaning and scope of
the phrase “in like circumstances.”26 The Arbitral Panel sought
guidance from other agreements that use similar language, such
as the Canada-U.S. FTA. As the Panel noted, this agreement contains an exception to NT in services trade,27 where “the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary for prudential,
fiduciary, health and safety, or consumer protection reasons,” and
explicitly imposes the burden of satisfying the exception on the
party according different treatment.28 The Panel then observed
that the phrase “like circumstances” may properly include differential treatment, under the conditions specified in the CanadaU.S. FTA.29
Upon this reading of “like circumstances” and under the
light of NAFTA’s trade liberalization objectives,30 the Panel
reached the conclusion that the “in like circumstances” language
constitutes an exception to the non-discrimination disciplines
and should thus be interpreted narrowly.31 The Panel explained
that “differential treatment should be no greater than necessary
for legitimate regulatory reasons such as safety, and that such
different treatment be equivalent to the treatment accorded to
domestic service providers.”32
The Cross-Border Trucking Panel’s analysis highlights the
difficulties involved in the operation of non-discrimination disciplines. In particular, the Panel’s reading of “like circumstances”
Spring 2011

as an exception to differential treatment could serve to avoid
unreasonable results, considering that NAFTA’s investment
chapter does not explicitly contain prudential exceptions for
the protection of health, safety, and the environment that could
justify departure from its substantive obligations, unlike trade in
goods and services.33
Other NAFTA arbitral tribunals have confronted similar
issues and adopted a similar rationale in the context of national
treatment. The S.D. Myers Tribunal, for example, noted that the
“assessment of like circumstances must also take into account
circumstances that would justify governmental regulation that
treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.”34
In a similar jurisprudential vein, the Parkering Tribunal
considered environmental criteria in its application of the nondiscrimination standards.35 This case involved parking works
and operations within the old city of Vilnius, Lithuania, which
was protected by the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.36 The investor claimed that other parking works and operations had been
treated differently.37 The Parkering Tribunal applied a binary
construct to the non-discrimination standard: it compared certain economic operators, on the one hand, and it examined the
policy underlying the differential treatment, on the other.38 In
this reading, the non-discrimination standard implicitly incorporates an exception for measures justified by legitimate governmental policies.
It would appear at first sight that this formula could avoid
excessive outcomes by taking into account HSE considerations
to justify differential treatment. However, the practical effect of
such reading reduces the policy space available to governments,
as the meaning of “like circumstances” is narrowed down by the
IIA’s economic objectives. Such a narrow reading of the object
and purpose of IIAs risks frustrating mutually supportive trade
and environment regimes, as the legitimacy of public policy
goals is solely or predominantly evaluated through the lens of the
investment liberalization goals. Moreover, by defining the purpose of investment agreements as tools for protecting investors,
all doubts and ambiguities are resolved in the investors’ favor. To
overcome this apparent lack of balance, IIAs should be appreciated as instruments for sustainable development—embracing its
three pillars: economic, social, and environment—and properly
placed in the broader international law universe.
The reading of “like circumstances” as an exception also
suffers from deficiencies relating to scope and the burden of
proof. In regards to the burden of proof, the interpretation that
treats “like circumstances” as an exception requires the respondent government to justify its regulations, relieving the applicant
of establishing relevant, material facts and proving all the elements of its claim.39 Then in regards to scope, the “exceptional”
formulation of “in like circumstances” hinges on “necessity”
considerations, where arbitral tribunals run the risk of secondguessing government regulators by testing potentially available
least trade restrictive measures against investment liberalizing
objectives. The deficiencies of such “exceptional” readings are
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amplified by the complexity and dynamism of market structures,
as well as by evolving scientific knowledge and changing social
preferences in the modern regulatory State.
Instead, in the investment context, “like circumstances”
should be read in light of its role as the key operative element
of the non-discrimination standards, rather than as a defense,
exception, or justification against MFN or NT obligations. In
such role, “like circumstances” does not involve presumptions,
narrow interpretations, or transfers in the burden of proof. Similarly, such reading does not transpose the WTO necessity test
into the operation of investment non-discrimination disciplines.
As an operative element of the standard, the “like circumstances” test requires the identification of all relevant circumstances that serve to distinguish among foreign investors,
including HSE considerations. In that context, as clarified by
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), analysis of conditions of competition in specific economic sectors provide a point of departure, but neither exhaust
the task of establishing the category of actors that should be compared, nor the policy objectives that can be taken into account to
define relevant parameters for comparison.40 It appears that the
objective relevance of the circumstances for each specific case
seems to be the correct standard of reference,41 including circumstances pertaining to HSE risks. Particular circumstances
with respect to HSE issues should constitute a valid basis for distinguishing among otherwise similar investments or investors.42
Reading “like circumstances” as an operative element of
the NT and MFN standards would do greater justice to the text
and context of IIAs and would have positive systemic effects.
This reading would not presume discrimination in the face of
differential treatment or effects. Furthermore, this reading
would also avoid a mechanical transposition of WTO law and
jurisprudence into IIAs, both of which are different treaties with
different parties, history, practice, text and context, structure,
obligations, and remedies, thereby also avoiding the application
of a goods analysis, or a services analysis, to investment
matters. Finally, the scope of like circumstances would not be
narrowed by the sole consideration of trade and investment
objectives, thereby contributing to building mutually supportive
environment and investment regimes.
The GAMI Tribunal confirmed the role of policy considerations in the determination of “likeness,” and not as an “exception” to non-discrimination disciplines:
The Arbitral Tribunal has not been persuaded that
GAM’s circumstances were demonstrably so “like”
those of non-expropriated mill owners that it was
wrong to treat GAM differently. The Government may
have been clumsy in its analysis of the relevant criteria
for the cutoff line between candidates and non-candidates for expropriation. Its understanding of corporate
finance may have been deficient. But ineffectiveness
is not discrimination. The arbitrators are satisfied that
a reason exists for the measure which was not itself
discriminatory. That measure was plausibly connected
with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar
7

industry was in the hands of solvent enterprises) and
was applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a
disguised barrier to equal opportunity.43
Following the reasoning of the GAMI Award, differential
treatment based on HSE considerations would not be on the
basis of nationality, but on the basis of legitimate regulatory
objectives. This rationale applies with particular force with
respect to HSE measures of general application. But what about
HSE measures that call for differential treatment on the basis of
the nationality of the investor?
Governmental measures implementing multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) may well have implications
for the NT and MFN standards in IIAs.44 For example, an MEA
allowing performance requirements to transfer environmentally
sound technology might place greater burdens on a foreign as
compared to domestic investors, and environmental controls
arising out of the Clean Development Mechanism established
under the Kyoto Protocol may require countries to discriminate
between different categories of investors on the basis of nationality.45 In these situations, is the phrase “in like circumstances”
broad enough to safeguard nationality-based discrimination
based on an MEA?
Markedly, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal presented a “like circumstances” formulation that purports to go beyond discrimination on the basis of nationality: “[a] formulation focusing on
the like circumstances question, on the other hand, will require
addressing any difference in treatment, demanding that it be
justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to
rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over
foreign owned investments.”46 Further, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal explicitly noted that differences in treatment will presumptively violate the non-discrimination standards, “unless they
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1)
do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign
owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.”47
According to this reading, “in like circumstances” can safeguard HSE measures expressing rational government policies
but not if HSE measures, by design, distinguish between investors on the basis of nationality. Thus, under this construct, MEAbased requirements would fail the non-discrimination test.
This solution may not contribute to mutual supportiveness
between investment law and international environmental law
because it could frustrate the objectives of MEAs. Three alternative options provide for a solution whereby the MEA-based,
nationality requirement can co-exist with the non-discrimination standards. First, “in like circumstances” could consider
the fact that the HSE measure is based on an MEA. Second, a
conflict of norms analysis could apply to the conflict between
the investment norm and the MEA norm, giving priority to the
MEA obligation on account of the lex specialis principle. Third,
general exceptions for HSE measures, where available, could
safeguard nationality-based distinctions effected by HSE measures pursuant to MEAs. These three options would not frustrate
the objectives of investment law because the nationality-based
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distinctions would not be arbitrary or a disguise for an impermissible motive. Further, their rational basis and legitimate policy
goals are underscored by the fact that they have been established
by the international community in an international treaty—the
MEA—seeking solutions to global HSE risks.

In Like Circumstances & the Relevant Comparators
Then on the question of the determination of relevant comparators for the operation of the “like circumstances” test, the
Occidental case, involving discrimination claims by an oil producer against the application of Ecuadorean tax law, provides a
platform for analysis.48 The key issue before the tribunal turned
on the meaning of “in like situations.”49 Occidental argued that
“in like situations” did not refer to companies in the same sector of activity, such as oil producers, but to companies that were
engaged in exports, even if encompassing different sectors.50
Occidental further argued that a number of companies involved
in the export of flowers, mining, seafood products, lumber,
bananas, and African palm oil were entitled to receive Value
Added Tax (“VAT”) refunds and continuously enjoyed that benefit.51 Ecuador responded that “in like circumstances” could not
extend to sectors other than oil producers because the whole purpose of the VAT refund policy was to ensure that the conditions
of competition were not changed.52 Ecuador further noted that
with respect to VAT refunds, all oil producers were treated alike,
including the national State oil company, Petroecuador.53
The Occidental Tribunal found in favor of the claimant
on the basis of thin reasoning and doubtful propositions, two
of which will be noted here. First, the Tribunal noted that “the
purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as compared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing
exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is undertaken.”54 Such formulation is problematic, not least because it
neglects the essence of non-discrimination principles in securing
equal access to opportunity, particularly in respect to the conditions of competition.55 Further, the public interest implications
of such an unbalanced reading are readily apparent, including
with respect to HSE measures, as governments will differentiate
among different sectors for entirely legitimate reasons.56
A more balanced approach to non-discrimination has been
elaborated by the OECD, a forum convening the most heavily
regulated States in the world, in the context of the 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.57 In its 1993 interpretation of the NT standard included in
the 1976 Declaration, the OECD observed that:
As regards the expression “in like situations”, the
comparison between foreign-controlled enterprises
established in a Member country and domestic enterprises in that Member country is valid only if it is made
between firms operating in the same sector. . . . More
general considerations, such as the policy objectives
of Member countries, could be taken into account to
define the circumstances in which comparison between
foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permis-

sible inasmuch as those objectives are not contrary to
the principle of National Treatment.58
A second doubtful proposition underlying the Occidental
Tribunal’s extremely broad reading of “in like situations” relates
to the linkages between disparate treatment and protectionism.
The Occidental Tribunal noted that it was “convinced” that
Occidental’s less favorable treatment, i.e., the fact that unlike
flower exporters it was denied VAT refunds, was not the result
of discriminatory intent.59 Without more, this statement equates
disparate impact with discrimination, and this interpretation dramatically compromises a government’s ability to regulate in the
public interest, including by way of differential and incremental policy approaches.60 In this regard, it may be useful to recall
the attempt by the Chair of the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement
on Investment Negotiating Group to put together a package of
proposals to address member States’ concerns on the impact on
regulatory autonomy of the NT and MFN standards:61
The fact that a measure applied by a government has a
different effect on an investment or investor of another
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsistent with national treatment and most favoured nation
treatment. The objective of “in like circumstances” is to
permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances,
including those relating to a foreign investor and its
investments, in deciding to which domestic or third
country investors and investments they should appropriately be compared.62
This approach is more nuanced and recognizes both the
close link between discrimination and equal opportunity. It also
recognizes the fact that a government may treat economic operators differently for entirely legitimate policy reasons.

Conclusion
The operation of the relative non-discrimination standards
can penetrate deeply into the regulatory sphere of the State, since
they require the State to adduce a coherent explanation of the
relevant categories and distinctions underlying the content and
scope of application of an internal measure. Policy rationales
for disparate treatment can involve a number of public interest
regulations, including with respect to the environment, health,
and safety. In this regard, interpreting “in like circumstances”
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards in
IIAs that accounts for all relevant circumstances relating to the
investment, rather than as a narrow exception that transfers to
the State the burden of justifying its policy preferences, contributes to preserving the policy space necessary for the exercise
of governmental authority in respect of health, safety, and the
environment. Thus, the interpretation of “in like circumstances”
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards
ultimately contributes to building channels of dialogue between
legal regimes relevant to sustainable development.

Endnotes: Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development
on page 35
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Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food
Security Goals*
by Karen Hansen-Kuhn**

T

Introduction

o the people of poor nations, we pledge to work
alongside you to make your farms flourish and
let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like
ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer
afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor
can we consume the world’s resources without regard to
effect. For the world has changed, and we must change
with it.
—President Barack Obama1
More than any U.S. president in history, Barack Obama
has focused public attention on global hunger and the need to
bolster food production by small-scale farmers in developing
countries. He championed this cause at the 2009 G-8 meeting
in L’Aquila, Italy, where he called on world leaders to commit
$20 billion to address food security, promising $3.5 billion from
the United States.2 After a series of consultations among various government agencies and civil society organizations, the
Obama Administration launched the Feed the Future initiative in
April 2010.3 This program emphasizes the importance of smallscale farmers, especially women, in country-led programs and
a multiagency “whole of government” approach to global food
security.4
Conversely, trade talks are gaining new momentum. After
a two-year lull following the collapse of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) talks in 2008, G-20 leaders have called for
a resumption of the negotiations in 2011, with WTO Director
General Pascal Lamy calling for completion of draft modality
texts by the end of March.5 The United States is also promoting
its own ambitious agenda of regional and bilateral trade talks.
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership continue to advance
and to expand to even more countries in Southeast Asia.6 The
U.S. and South Korean governments recently resolved remaining differences over market access for automobiles in the United
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”).7 That agreement,
along with pending bilateral agreements with Panama and
Colombia, could be introduced for Congressional approval in
2011.8
The food, finance, and climate crises are all evidence of how
much the world has changed since the era of free trade accords
began, but the U.S. agricultural trade agenda remains essentially
the same as the approach first adopted in the 1990s under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).9 Recent
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reports of rising food prices and riots in some countries10 add
new urgency to the imperative to get these policies right.
U.S. trade policy must start from our goals rather than our
tactics. Ending global hunger, enhancing incomes and employment, and encouraging a transition to climate friendly agriculture
should be the goals of U.S. agricultural, economic, and development policy. Trade policy should be a tool to support those goals
rather than a loose cannon that shoots them down.

From Dumping to Volatility: The Lessons
of Trade Liberalization
Much of the international debate on trade and agriculture
over the past decade has focused on U.S. (and EU) agricultural
subsidies11 but have not addressed the systemic causes of dumping, i.e., exporting at below the cost of production. Floods of
cheap imports, especially during the harvest, can be devastating for developing-country farmers.12 As of 2003, dumping
margins for U.S. commodity crops supported under the Farm
Bill included wheat exports at an average price of twenty-eight
percent below the cost of production, corn at ten percent, and
rice at twenty-six percent below the cost of production.13 Today,
recurring bouts of rising food prices have decreased the extent of
dumping,14 but deregulated trade continues to present challenges
for stable local food markets.
Over the last few decades, U.S. agricultural policy has
changed from a system of supply management to one more
dependent on free-market forces. This process culminated in the
1996 Farm Bill, which removed the last vestiges of supply management and enacted policies to encourage farmers to increase
the volume of production to compensate for lower prices, with
a strong focus on creating new markets overseas for U.S. commodities.15 That system soon resulted in a series of crises in rural
* This is a revised version of Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Making U.S. Trade Policy
Serve Global Food Security Goals, Inst. for Agric. & Trade Pol’y (Jan. 2011),
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID=451&refID=107901.
** International Program Director, Trade and Global Governance, Institute
for Agriculture and Trade Policy (“IATP”). Karen Hansen-Kuhn joined IATP
in September 2009. She has been working on trade and economic justice since
the beginning of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) debate,
focusing especially on bringing developing countries’ perspectives into public
debates on trade, food security, and economic policy. She has published articles
on U.S. trade and agriculture policies, the impacts of U.S. biofuels policies on
food security, and women and food crises. She was the international coordinator
of the Alliance for Responsible Trade (“ART”), a U.S. multi-sectoral coalition
promoting just and sustainable trade until 2005. After that, she was Policy Director at the U.S. office of ActionAid, an international development organization.
She holds a B.S. in international business from the University of Colorado and a
master’s degree in International Development from American University.
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areas and the enactment of emergency payments, later codified
as the current system of agricultural subsidies.16
Commodity prices skyrocketed during 2007 and 2008,
and farmers were better able to cover their costs of production,
reducing counter-cyclical payments from the U.S. government
to farmers, which rise to compensate farmers when prices are
low for those crops.17 As a result of this increase in commodity prices, U.S. agricultural subsidies dropped from more than
twenty-four billion dollars in 2005 to just over twelve billion
dollars in 2009.18 In many countries, locally grown food suddenly became cheaper than imports, but after decades of neglect
of agricultural sectors, production levels were too low to be
able to fully meet domestic demand.19 Concerns over dumping have been overtaken by alarm over food-price volatility, as
wild swings in prices make planning more and more difficult for
farmers around the world.
The precise causes of the 2008 food price crisis and
the recent bouts of price swings are still the subject of much
debate.20 They include rising demand, extreme weather conditions, and excessive financial institution speculation on commodity markets.21 New limits on commodity speculation in the
United States and EU are imperative to decrease the wild price
swings experienced in recent years.22 However, policymakers in
developing countries also need new ways to manage trade flows,
so they can rebuild fragile agricultural sectors.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides a telling example of the dangers of this approach for food security and rural
livelihoods. The agreement eliminated trade barriers for most
sectors, with tariffs on corn and beans phased out over fourteen
years.23 In fact, the Mexican government accelerated the tariff
reduction schedule, and United States exports of corn to Mexico
nearly quadrupled compared to the pre-NAFTA levels.24 Mexican agricultural exports to the United States also increased at an
average of ten percent a year,25 but the benefits of those sales
did not trickle down to rural communities. Many Mexican farmers were unable to compete with the cheap imports, and more
than two million have left the agricultural sector since NAFTA
began, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent.26 Since job creation
in other sectors of the economy has been weak, rural poverty has
increased and many people have been forced to migrate to cities
in search of elusive manufacturing sector jobs or to the United
States in search of better opportunities.27
There is little evidence that the growth in U.S. exports under
NAFTA has helped family farmers in this country either. The
number of Americans employed in agriculture has dropped since
the agreement began (as has manufacturing employment).28
The relationship between employment and trade is complex,
even in the United States, as job creation from export growth
can be offset by job losses resulting from imports that compete
with domestic production. The kind of production also matters
as large-scale agro-industrial production for export generally
employs fewer people than smaller-scale, locally oriented production. As smaller-scale producers have been forced to seek offfarm income, larger producers and corporations have increased
their share of production. Over the last twenty-five years, there
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has been a marked shift in the size of U.S. farms, with very small
farms (with annual sales less than ten thousand dollars) and very
large farms (sales exceeding one million dollars) increasing
by thirty-eight and 243 percent, respectively.29 The number of
small, but commercially viable farms (sales between ten and two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars) dropped by forty percent,
from half of total farms in 1982 to less than a third in 2007.30
The percentage of U.S. agricultural production controlled by the
top four firms in a given sector has increased substantially, rising
from seventy-two percent of beef packing in 1990, for example,
to 83.5 percent in 2005.31
Since NAFTA, U.S. agricultural production, both for
domestic use and exports, has increased while rural employment
and livelihoods have faltered. While a substantial portion of corn
production is now directed to domestic ethanol production,32
exports of corn, wheat, and other commodity crops have continued to grow.33 According to the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) estimates, agricultural bulk export volumes increased eight percent in 2010 over 2009 levels, while the
bulk export values increased seventeen percent.34
The recent surge in U.S. farm income is instructive. Net
farm income increased twenty-six percent in 2010 over the
2000–2009 average, triggered, according to some analysts, by
rising exports.35 However, the USDA also notes that,
[a] second feature of the 2000–2009 decade is the high
and persistent levels of volatility in agricultural commodity and input (feed, fuel, and fertilizer) markets.
The volatility is reflected in the patterns of farm income
during the decade. Net farm income increased in 6 of
the 10 years, posting an average increase of 26.6 percent in the years with increases in farm income and
an average decline of 23.5 percent in the other years
(2002, 2005, 2006, and 2009).36
These wild swings in prices and incomes destabilize rural
communities and contribute to increasing corporate concentration. Whether in the United States or overseas, agricultural policies that stabilize prices at levels nearer the cost of production
could provide consistent signals and incentives to help farmers
stay on their land and produce stable food supplies.37
These problems are not unique to the NAFTA partners.
In country after country, trade liberalization in agriculture has
weakened local production and undermined rural livelihoods.38
Women produce sixty to eighty percent of food in many developing countries.39 They are particularly vulnerable to the risks
created by dumping and volatile markets, since their access to
productive resources is often already precarious. The emphasis
on agricultural exports in the 1990s tended to result in a shift
away from food production for household consumption, which
tended to be controlled by women, to cash crops, which tended
to be controlled by men.40 The U.S. Feed the Future initiative
recognizes the vital importance of women’s contributions to
food security and would direct more resources to women farmers.41 If the point of the U.S. global hunger policy is to improve
food security and rural livelihoods for women and men, then
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appropriate trade mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure
that they can stay on their land.
Haiti is another stark example of how trade policies can
undermine food security. As recently as the 1980s, Haiti produced eighty percent of the rice it needed for domestic consumption.42 Under structural adjustment programs imposed by the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and United
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”),
among others, Haiti lifted import controls and reduced public
support to agriculture.43 Today, it imports eighty percent of its
rice needs and receives substantial food aid for recurring food
shortages.44
In March 2010, former President Bill Clinton testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the push to export rice
to Haiti had been a grave mistake, stating:
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy,
until the last year or so when we started rethinking it,
that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should
sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank goodness,
they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not
worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers
in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing
the finger at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day
with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a
rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what
I did. Nobody else.45
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the U.S. government
has in fact started to rethink this policy. The President’s 2010
Trade Policy Agenda clearly stated the intention to expand U.S.
exports, even to developing countries.46 While Least Developed
Countries (“LDCs”) are not being asked to agree to any new
commitments to reduce tariffs under the Doha Round, there is
no indication that United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)
is reconsidering the wisdom of the previous rounds of tariff
reductions.
A better approach would be to explicitly exempt low-income
food import-dependent countries from U.S. export promotion
goals and to allow flexibility to establish tariff rates adequate
to protect their vulnerable agricultural markets. The LDCs, as
defined by the United Nations, include some forty-eight leastdeveloped countries, thirty-one of which are also members of
the WTO.47 It includes such countries as Haiti, Senegal, and
Bangladesh, many of which experienced food riots during the
2008 price spike.48 The United States does not have free-trade
trade agreements with any of these countries, so this would be a
relatively simple first step.
A second step would be to more carefully consider poverty
and hunger within middle-income countries. USTR has entered
into a series of discussions with India, Brazil, South Africa, and
China, both to enlist their support to restart the WTO talks, and
to press them to liberalize their own markets.49 Each of these
countries is unique, but they all face challenges in local food
production. According to research prepared for the United
11

Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Development Report, there are more poor people in India than in the
twenty-six African countries combined,50 and suicides by farmers who have lost their land are devastating evidence of the fragility of their agricultural system.51
Developing countries in the G-33 have argued for WTO
exemptions for Special Products and for the establishment of a
new Special Safeguard Mechanism to protect food security and
livelihoods and to advance rural development.52 While WTO
members (including the United States) committed to the principle of protecting local markets to advance food security at the
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, in practice this has been a central
point of contention in the WTO talks.53 The G-33’s insistence
on these mechanisms (as well as United States intransigence on
subsidies) was one of the key factors in the collapse of the WTO
talks in 2008.54 A better approach would be to work with developing countries to consider the best ways to implement these
mechanisms and other necessary measures to advance food
security goals over export promotion.

The Trade Rules Needed to Respond to
Climate and Food Crises
Agriculture has always been subject to unpredictable
weather patterns, pests, and diseases. These risks are exacerbated by climate change, which is already causing changes in
growing seasons and increases in droughts and flooding.55 These
effects will become more frequent and more devastating in years
to come,56 making it even more important to support flexible and
innovative new approaches in developing countries. Efforts to
strengthen local agricultural production in ways that respond to
these challenges and benefit local communities and plans to foster regional cooperation in times of crisis are critical.
National and regional coordination of food reserves is
emerging as an important tool to confront volatility in food supplies. The UN Comprehensive Framework for Action on the
Global Food Crisis (a multiagency effort to coordinate donor
policies) recognizes the importance of reserves.57 Reserves and
other measures to limit price volatility and supply availability
will be at the center of the agenda at the May 2011 G-20 Agriculture Ministers summit and the fall Committee on World Food
Security meeting.58
Several groupings of countries are already taking action to
implement regional reserves systems. “In March 2010, Brazil,
Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) agreed to support the
establishment of a system of national grain reserves.”59 In October, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) plus
Japan, China, and Korea committed to establish a regional emergency rice reserve, building on a pilot program that has been
operating for several years.60 In December, West African nations
meeting in the Club du Sahel explored proposals to coordinate
national food reserves systems to assist each other in cases of
crop failures or other crises.61
A system of food reserves does not replace international
trade, but it can be an important means to stabilize national
and regional food supplies. Food reserves can be supported or
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constrained by trade rules that govern public support to agriculture. WTO rules and U.S. trade policy discourage public management of food supplies, but there is some degree of flexibility
that would not prevent countries from starting to implement
such programs.62 Food reserves do require public support to buy
and sell stocks. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture limits how
much governments can spend to support agriculture.63 While the
establishment of a grain reserve in the United States could raise
overall support beyond those limits, developing countries would
be unlikely to exceed the limits included under current rules.
Price bands could be a bigger issue for U.S. trade policy.
Most reserves systems operate so that when prices reach predetermined floors or ceilings the government intervenes.64 If it
has buffer stocks, it could release those reserves onto the market
to reduce high prices or confront local food shortages. It would
purchase grains when prices are low, particularly during the harvest. These price bands are often coordinated with trade policy,
with tariffs on imports triggered when prices fall, and reduced
when they rise. While WTO rules generally limit such measures,
in practice, many developing countries have some degree of flexibility in the application of tariff rates.65 Since many of them
have agreed to bound tariff rates (ceilings) that are higher than
the actual applied rates, they could utilize the difference in tariff
rates (“water” in WTO lingo) to operate a price band and still
comply with WTO rules.66 The G-33’s proposals for a Special
Safeguard Mechanism would institutionalize price bands as a
legitimate tool to combat volatility.67 USTR has argued against
these measures at the WTO, pressing for reductions in bound
tariff rates and opposing the G-33’s proposal for a Special Safeguard Mechanism.68 In negotiations for a US-Andean Free Trade
Agreement, the United States insisted on the dismantling of
the system of price bands established under the Andean Pact.69
Those negotiations were later narrowed to a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Peru, which liberalized all trade
in agricultural goods and eliminated the Peruvian government’s
participation in the regional price band.70
The conflicts between trade rules and food reserves could
emerge in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“TPP”). The TPP talks currently include Australia, Brunei,
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United
States, and Vietnam.71 The Philippines, Canada, and Japan have
also expressed interest in joining the talks.72 Brunei, Malaysia,
Vietnam and the Philippines are also members of ASEAN and
are participating in the Emergency Rice Reserve System, as is
South Korea.73 Those talks should balance interests in expanding trade with the measures needed to support food reserves and
other elements of food security.

Integrating Nutrition in Trade and
Development
Improving food security means increasing both the quantity
of food available to local consumers and ensuring that its nutritional quality is adequate. The administration’s Feed the Future
initiative lists two central objectives: accelerating inclusive agriculture sector growth, and improving nutritional status.74 U.S.
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trade policy focuses on harmonizing food safety standards (both
to generate new market opportunities and to ensure consumer
safety),75 but it does not consider the nutritional value of the
kinds of food systems encouraged by liberalization of trade and
investment.
The debate on nutritional quality is already underway within
the United States, where concerns about rising obesity rates and
food safety have increased demand for organic foods and locally
grown fruits and vegetables.76 There is a growing public recognition that Farm Bill supports for corn, soy, wheat, and rice
have shifted diets towards processed foods and meats rather than
healthier alternatives.77 U.S. trade policy should also reflect this
new thinking in the kinds of food production encouraged by liberalized trade and the innovations needed to improve nutritional
outcomes.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides some important lessons. Since the agreement’s inception in 1994, Mexican imports of corn and soy used for animal feed, as well as
of processed snack foods, soda and other foods characteristic
of unhealthy diets, have skyrocketed.78 Liberalization of trade
and investment rules has also spurred sharp increases in U.S.
investment all along the Mexican supply chain, including food
processing, supermarkets and fast food restaurants.79 Obesity
rates in Mexico have risen to rates similar to those in the United
States.80 Among OECD countries, Mexico is now tied with
the United States for the highest per capita obesity rates in the
world.81 The phenomenon of increasing malnutrition occurring
at the same time as over-nutrition is escalating in many countries
around the world as people just above the poverty line consume
increasing amounts of meats, processed foods and other relatively low-cost, high-calorie foods.82
The United States cannot legislate consumer demand in
other countries, but it could assure that its trade policy does not
preclude governments from implementing changes in local food
systems to improve the quality of food available to consumers. A
government might decide, for example, to procure fresh food for
anti-poverty programs from local farm cooperatives rather than
importing it from a multinational corporation (along the lines of
Brazil’s successful Zero Hunger program).83 Depending on how
the government has listed the implementing agencies in its trade
commitments, these kinds of programs could conflict with procurement rules that aim to prevent discrimination against foreign
suppliers.84
Some types of food security programs could also be the
target of investor lawsuits. Like nearly all U.S. trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA allows foreign
investors to sue governments for compensation for regulatory
changes or programs that undermine their expected profits.85
One section of the investment chapter bans certain “performance
requirements” on foreign investors, including the requirement to
achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content in production.86 Thus, for example, if the Mexican government were to
require tortilla manufacturers in Mexico to use a certain percentage of locally grown (and more expensive) corn in their produc-
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tion, U.S. companies that own tortilla operations there could sue
for compensation.
Most trade agreements include recourse to state-to-state dispute resolution.87 The investor-state provision allows companies
to bypass that mechanism, as well as local court systems, to sue
governments directly.88 Most environmental, labor, and other
public-interest groups have argued against this provision in most
bilateral trade agreement the United States has negotiated since
NAFTA.89
These concerns are not just theoretical. The U.S.-based Metalclad corporation was awarded $15.6 million in compensation
when it sued the Mexican government over a local community’s
refusal to reopen a toxic waste facility.90 A subsidiary of the
U.S.-based Bechtel corporation sued the Bolivian government
when it cancelled the privatization of a water distribution system
in the wake of widespread public protests over excessive user
fees.91 In 2010, Phillip Morris filed an investor-state suit against
the Uruguayan government over rules on health warnings on cigarette packages.92 Even when such suits are unsuccessful, they
have a chilling effect on local efforts to balance public interests
with private profits.
Some trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties
include tentative first steps that could start to address that imbalance. The United States-Peru FTA, for example, establishes
some general exceptions for measures designed to protect public health, safety and the environment, but these exceptions do
not apply to the chapter on investment.93 This kind of exception
should be applied more broadly to specifically exempt public
interest laws from challenges.94
Unfortunately, current U.S. trade policy seems to be headed
in the opposite direction, affirming the Bush era approach. News
reports indicate that the United States is pressing Australia,
which refused to include the investor-state provision in its FTA
with the United States, to reconsider that position in the talks
for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 The recently signed US-Korea
FTA resorts to the old approach as well, with only limited excep
tions to protect the public good.96

Recommendations
Ultimately, the U.S. government should take a comprehensive set of acts that will alleviate these problems. It should
review provisions in existing trade agreements that undermine
food security and launch a process to reform them.97 The administration should explicitly exempt Least Developed Countries
from U.S. export-promotion goals, and work with developing
countries to establish trade rules that support price bands and
other mechanisms to promote stable food supplies. On an intergovernmental level, it should support proposals at the WTO and
in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership for Special
Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms to advance food
security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Lastly, the
United States could establish exceptions to investment and procurement provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other
ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to protect public health and
food security.
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Conclusion
Rather than continuing with the same tired approaches
used in recent decades, it is time for a truly twenty-first century
approach to trade policy, one that starts with a clear commitment
to strengthening food systems and rural livelihoods in the South
and North. It is not enough to consider changes in trade balances
or growth in exports in particular sectors. We must examine how
those changes affect our societies and environments, both in the
North and South.
The 2008 food price crisis led to a reexamination of agricultural development policies and the conclusion that decades of
neglect of public investment in the sector had been a mistake.98
President Obama took a leadership role in the 2009 G-8 meeting,
committing to scale up food security spending and calling on
other countries to do the same.99 The Feed the Future initiative
and increases in U.S. government spending on food security are
evidence of a commitment to redress that mistake and chart a
new course to decrease global hunger.
Sadly, that effort will likely collide with the administration’s
push to double U.S. exports and negotiate new trade agreements
along the same lines as the past. Spending to increase production by smallholder farmers will be undercut by floods of U.S.
exports. Efforts to establish food reserves could be undercut by
trade rules that restrict governments’ abilities to manage supplies.100 Programs to encourage consumption of healthy, locally
grown foods could collide with investor protections that fail to
balance public and private interests.101 Decades of expansion of
agricultural exports have not helped U.S. farmers either. Farm
incomes have been on a rollercoaster ride that has thrown farmers overboard, increasing corporate concentration.102 There is no
reason to expect that expanding the same failed policies of the
past will have better outcomes now.
Instead, trade and food security policy should focus on
rebuilding local food systems in the North and South. This does
not mean abandoning trade or closing markets, but considering
ways to ensure that trade complements, rather than substitutes
for, local food production. The U.S. government should work
with developing countries to determine the best ways to structure price bands and other trade protections to achieve food
security and development goals, rather than blocking progress
on these new approaches.
Added to the evidence of the past is the challenge of the
future. Climate change and the end of cheap oil is a dispositive
factor in determining food security and trade policy.103 Innovative new approaches that build on local knowledge to reduce
reliance on agrochemicals and imported inputs are not just exciting, they are imperative.104 Trade and development policies must
create the necessary policy space for these innovations rather
than insisting on the extension of twentieth century models of
industrial agriculture and dependence on imports.

Endnotes: Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food
Security Goals on page 36
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The Lurking Costs of Green Technology
Metals in a Global Market
by Winfield J. Wilson*

A

s the global market faces the challenge of responding
to climate change, including how to convert to a green
economy that uses renewable resources, it is critical
to examine domestic and international legal frameworks implicated at various points in the life cycle of metallic ore resources
employed in “clean” or “green” technology. 1 Although the
products themselves may or may not be environmentally-sound
because of their source production or their transformation into
waste at the end of their life, consumer demand for the green
labeling will continue to drive the production of such technology.2 International law and policy frameworks must take into
account the consequences of environmental “solutions” by
negotiating protective measures against the pollution created
at various stages of the life cycle of these metals and creating
incentives to induce responsible trade practices to prevent a
“race to the bottom” by governments willing to mine, process,
and ultimately dispose of spent materials.
Lithium and a suite of metals in the lowest rows of the
periodic table, called rare Earth elements, are valuable in a
wide range of industrial and commercial applications, including emerging green technologies.3 In nearly all stages in the life
cycle production of these metals there are energy intensive and
polluting processes used, from mining and smelting to recycling
and waste management.4 Furthermore, global climate change
concerns drive how various metals are supplied, used, and ultimately regulated.5 Trade in the raw materials used in green
technology is, for better or worse, spurred by and responding
to technological solutions that are perceived as tools to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions.
Against a global backdrop of increasing trade in particular metallic resources,6 at the domestic level, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulates hazardous
air pollutants under various mandates found in the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”).7 The EPA’s use of the CAA has come under increasing scrutiny and attention in regard to the authority to regulate
carbon dioxide,8 but the CAA has long served as the vehicle for
regulating other pollutants with transboundary effects, including some metals, and current proposed rulemaking demonstrates
this commitment.9
At the international level, various treaties address the longrange air pollutants related to particular industrial sources.10
The United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) treaty
negotiations on mercury and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”) offer frameworks to
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address energy production and specific industrial processes,
but are not universally-recognized, nor does either framework
address the market for the metals used in green technology.11
While U.S. and international regulations address some of
the issues presented by trade in the metals demanded by green
technology, none are adequate. Investment and development in
extracting and marketing the rare Earth elements are growing,
predominantly in Asia, where industrialization and the availability of many of these commodities allow for this rapid expansion.12 China dominates as the world leader in rare Earth supply,
processing, and export, but competition is springing up in other
countries, including Malaysia13 and the United States.14
The global trade in metals, including the rare Earth elements, requires further international and multilateral negotiation to promote the development of this industry in a socially
and environmentally responsible manner. A bilateral agreement
may be particularly appropriate to address the issue between the
United States and China. China is both the largest producer and
consumer of rare Earth metals; the United States is the next largest direct consumer, as well as the primary indirect consumer
through imports of products made with the metals from China.15
In other words, U.S. demand for electronic technologies produced by China plays a crucial role in the global market for these
metals. Therefore, it is only appropriate that the United States
play an equivalent role in mitigating the environmental effects
for which it is directly and indirectly responsible.16
On a broader and more comprehensive “cradle to grave”
approach for rare Earth metals, a multilateral agreement may be
appropriate and timely.17 A multilateral approach will allow for
the integration and harmonization of international oversight and
regulation of the global market’s supply and demand of these
metals, keeping their environmental footprint in step with other
multilateral environmental agreements. It is time for the international negotiations on climate change, hazardous and radioactive
waste management, and long-range air pollution to be reconciled
with the global markets’ response to them, particularly in regard
to the suite of useful but potentially damaging metals used in
green technology.
Endnotes: The Lurking Costs of Green Technology Metals in a
Global Market on page 38

* Winfield J. Wilson is a J.D. Candidate 2011 and M.P.P. Candidate 2012, at
American University, Washington College of Law and School of Public Affairs.
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Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil
& Gas Sector:
A Survey of Environmentally Relevant Clauses*
by Kyla Tienhaara**

T

Introduction

he Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010, which resulted in the largest ever accidental marine
oil spill,1 was a stark reminder of the environmental
risks posed by the oil and gas industry. Although disasters on
this scale are fortunately rare, the average oil and gas operation
has many other commonplace, yet significant, environmental
impacts throughout its lifespan. Environmental issues begin with
exploration activities—seismic tests, used to locate petroleum,
often disturb local wildlife—and carry on to the end of the production phase when facilities must be dismantled and disposed
of.2 The everyday operation of many offshore petroleum installations involves the discharge of oil-contaminated “produced
water,” drill cuttings and mud, and production chemicals.3
Onshore, land clearing for base camps, helipads, roads, pipelines, waste disposal sites, and other facilities has a considerable
ecological impact.4 Furthermore, the industry is a significant
contributor to air pollution and a major emitter of greenhouse
gases. In 2008, thirty-two companies in the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (“OGP”) reported emissions of
296 million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide, 2.1 million
tonnes of methane, 1.1 million tonnes of non-methane volatile
organic compounds, 366 thousand tonnes of sulfur dioxide, and
827 thousand tonnes of nitrous oxides.5
The industry faces increasingly strict environmental standards in developed countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom.6 However, the majority of the world’s proven
oil reserves are in developing countries and economies in transition, which often lack sophisticated regimes for environmental
protection.7 Even when legislative frameworks are well developed, there are often deficiencies in capacity and an unwillingness to monitor and enforce environmental regulation.8 There is,
furthermore, no comprehensive global convention on the environmental impacts of petroleum exploration and production.9
Although a number of multilateral and regional agreements
cover certain aspects of the industry, they require adoption into
domestic legislation to have a direct effect on international oil
companies (“IOCs”).10
Apart from domestic and international law, one could also
look at conditions attached to loans and investment insurance,
as well as voluntary corporate social responsibility codes as
sources of environmental standards for the petroleum industry.11
However, the intent of this article is to shine a light on a much
less studied and poorly understood domain of environmental
15

regulation: the foreign investment contracts signed between
IOCs (or consortiums of IOCs) and host states, which allocate
rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons within an area of
land (or an offshore block) over a fixed period of time.
In a 1994 monograph, Zhiguo Gao noted that environmental issues had “not received enough attention” in the oil and gas
contracts he had reviewed.12 His conclusion raises the question
of whether environmental issues have received greater attention in more recent oil and gas contracts (i.e. those negotiated
and signed in the last fifteen years). This question is difficult to
answer, not least because foreign investment contracts generally are not disclosed to the public.13 Many governments’ model
agreements are publicly available,14 but it should be noted that
these models may be substantially altered or ignored altogether
in the negotiation of actual contracts.15
In this article, sample clauses from forty-one upstream oil
and gas contracts (both onshore and offshore) covering thirtyfive countries and the period 1994-2008 were reviewed. Fourteen of the contracts were models.16 An effort was made to
find the most up-to-date model contracts, as governments periodically revise them. However, it should be noted that some of
the models were undated. The twenty-seven signed contracts
reviewed were from twenty-six different countries17 and had an
average signature date of 1999. Some of contracts in the sample
are available on the Internet, either because governments have
chosen to release them or because they have been leaked to nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have subsequently
published them. Others are available in company filings to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Given the small number of contracts that were reviewed, and
the great variety of clauses that were encountered, nothing can be
extrapolated from this preliminary survey about the frequency
with which any particular type of clause is likely to appear in oil
and gas contracts. Furthermore, in any given situation, a contract
should be considered within the broader context of a country’s
petroleum law, environmental law, and other domestic legislation. The purpose of the article is not to provide a full picture of
environmental regulation of petroleum operations in individual

* A lengthier version of this article was published in the online journal Oil, Gas
and Energy Law Intelligence in September 2010.
** Co-Director of the Climate and Environmental Governance Network and
Research Fellow at the Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National
University.
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countries, but instead to draw attention to how contracts can
either bolster or undermine environmental protection efforts.

Types of Foreign Investment Contracts
There are three main types of foreign investment contracts
in the upstream oil and gas sector: (1) concessions or licenses;
(2) production sharing contracts (or agreements) (“PSCs” or
“PSAs”); and (3) risk-service contracts. In addition, all three
may be subject to association or joint-venture agreements.18
Under concession contracts and licenses, IOCs are often given
exclusive rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and in
return are required to pay royalties, taxes, and fees to the government.19 In a PSC, the IOC has similar rights, but obtains only
“cost oil” and a share of any “profit oil” produced, with the state
recouping the remainder in lieu of, or sometimes in addition to,
collecting royalties.20 The IOC also pays taxes and fees.21 Under
a risk-service contract the IOC explores for and produces petroleum on behalf the government and is paid a fee for its services,
with a possible right to buy a portion of the production.22 Association or joint venture agreements involve IOCs partnering with
host governments or state-owned enterprises and, as in a PSC,
sharing petroleum production.23
In practice, these forms and labels tend to be much less
important than the specific content of a contract. 24 However,
one relevant difference is that unlike a typical concession, an
IOC’s costs are generally recoverable under a PSC in the form
of “cost oil.” 25 If costs associated with remediating and compensating for environmental harm are “cost recoverable,” then
the host government, not the IOC, would assume the risk of such
costs.26 A similar issue may arise with risk-service contracts and
even with concessions that have royalty rates that are somehow
indexed to costs.

Environmental Standards Clauses
Most, though not all, of the oil and gas contracts reviewed
contained a section on the environmental standards to be applied
to the project. In this regard, there are five general forms that
contracts appear to follow:
(i) reference to domestic environmental law only;
(ii) reference to international industry standards only;
(iii) reference to both domestic law and international
industry standards;
(iv) reference to domestic law and/or industry
standards and international environmental
agreements; or
(v) development of project-specific environmental
standards.
Some reference to domestic environmental legislation is
clearly desirable from a public policy perspective. Domestic
standards have been developed (in most cases) under a democratic system of rule, have often been designed with local environmental conditions in mind, are familiar to the agencies that
are tasked with monitoring and enforcement, and are in the public domain. However, as noted previously, in many developing
countries environmental regulation of the oil and gas sector is
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still in its infancy and it may be inadequate in some situations.27
As such, reference in contracts to domestic legislation alone may
be undesirable. In any event, it would appear that parties rarely
adopt this form. A contract from Peru28 and one from Algeria29
were the only contracts in the sample that referred solely to
domestic environmental legislation.
In several of the contracts in the sample, the parties instead
included a reference to international industry standards and
failed to mention the application of domestic environmental law.30 The advantage from an environmental perspective
of referring to international industry standards is that in some
cases, they may be higher than, or cover specific issues not
addressed in, domestic legislation. Furthermore, reference to
international standards allows some scope for change and evolution of the environmental management regime of an investment
over time, thus providing a way around a contractual requirement for stability, as will be discussed below. However, there are
serious problems with referring only to industry standards, given
their inherent ambiguity. The terminology “good oilfield practices”31 or “good production practices”32 is frequently employed
in environmental standards clauses, as well as in other types of
provisions discussed further below, but these phrases are seldom
defined.33 A 2002 Cambodian contract provides a rare example
of a definition:
Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards
and practices, and exercise of that degree of skill, prudence and foresight that would reasonably be expected
of persons carrying out international petroleum operations, and adherence to generally accepted standards of
the international petroleum industry, including sound
environmental provisions.34
It is not at all clear where exactly one should look for “generally accepted standards” as there are a multitude of potential
sources. For example, members of the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) “pledge” to manage their businesses according to a
set of eleven environmental principles.35 However, the majority
of these principles are imprecise, such as the commitment “to
reduce overall emission and waste generation.”36 The API also
has guidelines for environmental protection in both onshore
and offshore oil and gas operations, although they are not freely
available to the public.37 Other potential sources include guidelines produced by the previously mentioned OGP,38 the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association,39 as well
as bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”).40 As Wawryk notes, the existence of so many
guidelines in the petroleum industry makes it impossible to point
to one that can definitively be considered “good” practice and
furthermore the “actual practices of international oil companies .
. . vary from company to company and, for one company, across
jurisdictions . . . making it difficult to identify the best practices
actually in use.”41
The majority of contracts reviewed for this article contained
reference to both domestic environmental law and international
industry standards. In most cases, there was no mention of how
these two sources of standards would be reconciled in the event
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of a conflict. However, in some contracts a form of hierarchy was
established. For example, Article 21.1 of Brazil’s 2001 Model
Concession Contract indicates that industry standards are only
intended to act as a supplement to domestic legislation:
The Concessionaire shall adopt, at its own cost and
risk, all the necessary measures for the conservation of
reservoirs and other natural resources and for the protection of the air, soil and water in the surface or in the
subsurface, subject to Brazilian legislation and rules
about environment and, in their absence or lack, adopting Oil Industry Best Practice in this regard.42
In contrast, the clause below, from a 1994 Azerbaijani contract, has evidently been adopted to ensure that domestic environmental regulation is not more stringent than international
industry standards:
Contractor shall comply with present and future Azerbaijani laws or regulations of general applicability with
respect to public health, safety and protection and restoration of the environment, to the extent that such laws
and regulations are no more stringent than the then
current international Petroleum industry standards and
practices being at the date of execution of this Contract
those shown in Appendix IX, with which Contractor
shall comply.43
In addition to domestic law and industry standards, some
oil and gas contracts refer to international environmental agreements, although this does not seem to be a common practice. One
example is Article 6.5 of Liberia’s Model PSC, which states that:
“The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum
operations in accordance with the Environmental Protection
and Management Laws of Liberia and all international environmental practice.”44 It is questionable whether such a sweeping
reference to international environmental law will have anything
more than symbolic value. Provisions in multilateral environmental agreements are not only typically “soft” in nature; they
also generally require adoption in domestic legislation before
they can have any impact on private actors.45 Furthermore, few
environmental agreements tackle specific issues concerning the
management of petroleum exploration and production. However,
there are some treaties covering marine pollution that are relevant to offshore operations.46 In this respect, Mauritania’s 1994
Model PSC is less ambiguous in its reference to international
environmental law, noting in Article 6.6 that:
The Contractor shall take ail [sic] necessary precautions
to prevent pollution of the marine area of the Exploration Perimeter and observe, inter alias, the provisions
of the International Convention on the prevention of
petroleum pollution of sea waters signed in London on
May 12, 1954 and the amendments and texts enacted
for the implementation thereof.47
The final form of standards clause observed in the sample,
although only in one contract, is the development of a project-specific environmental regime. A 1996 contract between
Azerbaijan and a consortium of investors stipulates that the contractor, the state-owned oil company, and the State Committee
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on Ecology and Control over the Use of Natural Resources will
jointly agree on a set of safety and environmental standards
based on “(i) international petroleum industry standards and
experience with their implementation in exploration and production operations in other parts of the world and (ii) existing
Azerbaijan safety and environmental legislation.”48 Once developed, this set of standards can only be altered through a written
agreement and if any standards that have not been agreed upon
are applied to the project, the investor can invoke the contract’s
stabilization clause.

Stabilization Clauses
According to a 2008 study, the use of “stabilization clauses”
in host-government contracts “is widespread across industries
and regions of the world.”49 Stabilization clauses come in various forms.50 In their most basic form, they “freeze” the law that
applies to the investment at the time the contract is signed.51 A
more nuanced version is often referred to as an “economic equilibrium” clause, which requires the government to restore the
balance of risks and rewards established in a contract when it is
upset by a new regulation or tax.52 A stabilization clause can be
strictly circumscribed to only cover very specific issues, or the
parties to the contract can explicitly “carve out” areas such as
environmental protection from its application. For example, in a
1997 contract from Kazakhstan, the stabilization clause contains
the caveat:
provided, however, that no amendment to this Agreement shall be required hereunder as the result of (i)
changes to Laws concerning health, safety or environmental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent
with international standards for health, safety or environmental legislation and are applied on a non-discriminatory basis . . . .53
As Lorenzo Cotula notes, this provision is weakened by its
ambiguous reference to “international standards,”54 but it is still
far preferable to the stabilization clauses found in many contracts and even in model agreements that are worded in such a
broad manner that they can stifle any future regulation that might
be perceived to undermine the profitability of an investment,
including efforts to address corruption, to safeguard human
rights (including labor rights), and to protect the environment.55

Environmental Impact Assessment Clauses
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) and corresponding management plans have become a staple requirement
for investment projects in many sectors.56 Unfortunately, a recent
survey of environmental governance in petroleum producing
countries commissioned by the World Bank found that “much
of the emphasis of the EIA process appears directed towards
the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle
approach for minimizing environmental and social impact.”57
An EIA is typically mandated to be completed after a contract with the state has been signed58 and most of the contracts
reviewed for this article contained some reference to the need
for an EIA. However, the form of the EIA clauses varied widely
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

across the sample from a simple note of the existence of a
requirement,59 to detailed specifications of what the EIA should
cover, who should prepare it, when it should be submitted, and
so forth.60

Clauses On Access To Protected Areas
Petroleum operations are particularly contentious when
they are located, even partially, within wildlife reserves, parks,
or areas of cultural or biological significance.61 NGOs have
long argued that such areas should be off limits to the extractive industries,62 but most governments are not ready to forgo
the potential economic opportunities that the exploitation of
these areas offer. This is evident in several of the contracts in the
sample. For example, Article 37.6 of Madagascar’s 2006 Model
Offshore PSC states:
In the event that a portion of the Contract Area is
located within a natural reserve area, the Operator shall
deploy the necessary efforts in order to minimize the
negative impacts on these natural reserves, in accordance with generally accepted environmental practices
in the international petroleum industry.63
This is an incredibly weak provision. A 2004 PSC from
Uganda is similarly permissive, but it also contains a bizarre
caveat:
In the event of protest from responsible concerned third
parties within or outside Uganda regarding the conduct
of Petroleum Operations in any National Park or Game
Reserve and the consequent effects upon the environment or wildlife, the Government and Licensee shall
meet to determine what if any action should be taken.64
Given that this clause provides nothing more than an obligation for the investor and the government to meet, it is questionable why the parties bothered to include it at all.

Clauses on Access to Water &
Other Natural Resources
Petroleum operations require natural materials in their construction phase, and significant amounts of water and electricity
throughout their operation. While many operations are self-sufficient in terms of energy supply, other natural resources may need
to be obtained from within or outside the contract area.
From an environmental and community rights perspective,
as well as from an economic-development perspective, it is disturbing that many governments appear to focus solely on the
potential revenue that they can obtain from petroleum production and are willing to simply give away other valuable natural
resources under the terms of oil and gas contracts. For example,
Article 27.8 of Mozambique’s 2007 Model concession contract
provides for the right of the investor “to drill for and have the free
use of water and impound surface waters.”65 A contract from the
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is even broader, giving
the contractor the right to “freely use sand, water, electricity, and
any other natural resources located inside or outside the Contract
Area for the Petroleum Operations.”66
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Some of the contracts in the sample were completely silent
on the issue of access to natural resources, and a small number had more nuanced provisions than those quoted above. For
example, a 1994 contract from Ethiopia states that the contractor shall “have the right, subject to the approval of the Minister,
to use water in the Contract Area for operational purposes, but
the Contractor shall not deprive any land, domestic settlement
or livestock watering place of the water supply to which they
are accustomed.”67 A 2008 Model PSC from Bangladesh goes a
step further by requiring that the contractor pay for the natural
resources, such as water, that it utilizes.68

Clauses on Gas Flaring
The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the volume of associated gas being flared and vented globally every year was about
110 billion cubic meters—enough fuel to provide the combined
annual natural gas consumption of Germany and France.69
Although some short-term flaring during testing or in cases of
emergencies is accepted as standard practice in the industry, the
flaring of more substantial amounts of gas is only practiced in
poor countries with limited infrastructure and weak regulatory
institutions.70 Aside from being incredibly wasteful, flaring has a
significant impact on local air quality and also makes an appreciable contribution to climate change.71 At the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the World
Bank launched a Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative to
tackle the problem.72 Despite this development, and widespread
condemnation of the practice, flaring continues in many states.
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP admitted to flaring
18.6 tonnes of gas for every thousand tonnes of hydrocarbon that
they produced.73
Many oil and gas contracts, even recent models, appear to
be lenient on the issue of flaring. For example, the Bangladesh
2008 Model PSC notes in Article 15.3 that:
Any Associated Natural Gas as is not used under Article
15.1 or Article 15.2 and which Contractor does not consider possible to recover economically shall be offered
to Petrobangla without any payment to Contractor but
at Petrobangla’s cost at the well-head or field facilities
in the Production Area. To the extent that Petrobangla
does not so take any of such Associated Natural Gas,
Contractor may flare such Associated Natural Gas provided that such flaring is included in the Development
Plan submitted under Article 8.10.74
Although this clause gives priority to utilization of the
resource, there is no requirement for the gas to be reinjected
into the ground if it is not taken by the state-owned enterprise,
and economic concerns clearly trump environmental ones.75 A
1997 contract from Indonesia also reflects this position in the
statement that gas “may be flared if processing and utilization
thereof is not economical.”76 Other contracts, such as a 2000
contract from Belize77 and a 1998 contract from Angola,78 allow
for flaring only if it is authorized by the government. A Ugandan contract from 2004 also follows this model, but includes the
caveat that the government’s consent “shall not be unreasonably
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withheld or delayed.”79 The most stringent clauses, found in only
a few contracts in the sample, restricted flaring to cases of an
emergency or for safety reasons.80

Clauses on Responding to Emergencies
and Accidents
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP reported 2,978
spills greater than one barrel in size, resulting in the release of
18,266 tonnes of oil into terrestrial and marine environments.81
In many of the oil and gas contracts in the sample, the parties
have recognized that spills and other accidents and emergencies
have the potential to occur and should be planned for. As such,
as a part or separate from an EIA, an emergency response plan is
often required from the contractor.82
Some oil and gas contracts also cover three additional elements in respect of emergencies: notification, response, and
consequences for failure to respond. In the oil and gas contracts
reviewed, notification was limited to the contractor apprising the
government of the situation, but not the local community or the
broader public.83 In terms of response, the requirements were
often vague (e.g., “take prudent steps”) or simply provided reference to good oilfield practices.84 However, some of the contracts
in the sample did additionally stipulate that in the event that the
contractor did not act promptly to respond to an emergency or
accident, the government had the right to mount its own response
and charge the contractor for expenses that it incurred in doing
so. An example is found in a PSC from Ghana:
If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control,
clean up or repair any pollution or damage, GNPC
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after
giving Contractor reasonable notice in the circumstances, take any actions which are necessary, in accordance with accepted Petroleum industry practice and
the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall
be borne by Contractor and shall, subject to Article
17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs.85

Clauses on Liability, Indemnity, & Insurance
Liability for environmental damage is an increasingly
important issue for the oil industry. The dispute between Chevron and the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon concerning the
company’s liability for oil pollution is a prime example of why
most modern contracts have express provisions on liability that
cover environmental damage.86
Issues of liability for environmental damage can be complex, especially when multiple parties, including state-owned
enterprises, are involved in petroleum production. Contracts,
therefore, should have provisions that are explicit about who is
to be liable for what and to whom. The issue of “who” depends
somewhat on the form of contract, but generally it is the contractor or concessionaire (the IOC) who will be liable, except in
cases where fault can be directly attributed to the state or stateowned enterprise.87 If there is more than one contractor involved
in the project, then there will likely be a clause that stipulates
that they are jointly and severally liable.88
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The issue of “what” concerns the types of harms (e.g., only
death or injury or also “damage to the environment”), the period
in which the harms were caused (i.e. no liability for prior environmental damage established in a baseline assessment), and the
legal form of the liability (fault, strict, or absolute).89 Finally, on
the issue of to “whom” the contractor is liable, there are typically two separate issues covered in contracts: liability to the
state and liability to third parties. 90 In the latter case, the issue is
not directly one of liability—contracts cannot affect the rights of
third parties under national law—but rather one of indemnity.91
Through indemnity clauses, IOCs commit to compensate states
for any costs incurred resulting from a third-party liability suit.92
Most contracts in the sample made specific mention of
“pollution” or “environmental damage” in liability/indemnity
clauses and adopted a strict liability approach.93 However, a
2002 Cambodian94 contract provided only for fault liability. The
most developed liability/indemnity clause in the sample was
from a contract signed by Belize in 2000, which required that the
contractor contribute one tenth of one percent of the value of the
gross annual production to a fund managed by the government
“for the sole purpose of indemnification against any or all environmental damages cause during the petroleum operations.”95
An additional issue closely related to liability and indemnity
is the requirement for contractors to have insurance coverage.
These clauses often specify that insurance should cover “pollution” or “environmental damage.”96 One potential problem with
both liability/indemnity and insurance clauses is that the term
“pollution” is quite narrow and does not cover all of the various environmental impacts from oil and gas operations.97 Even
references to “environmental damage” could be subject to interpretation if not defined in the contract.

Clauses on Decommissioning & Remediation
When an oil operation reaches the end of production, a
number of costly activities must be undertaken. Onshore wells
need to be plugged and structures dismantled, with materials
removed and ultimately recycled or disposed of. Remediation of
the local environment (e.g., decontamination and revegetation)
may also be required. Offshore installations present particularly
complex issues in terms of decommissioning, although it is also
in this area that international law has its most direct and significant impact on the oil and gas industry.98
The extent to which decommissioning is dealt with in contracts depends somewhat on the contractual relationship between
the parties and the expected life of the project. Under some
arrangements, states retain ownership over production facilities
and may continue operations after the termination of the contract. However, even in such instances, there may be contractual
provisions covering decommissioning of installations that are
not destined to be taken over by the state.
Clauses on decommissioning and remediation found in contracts in the sample were generally lacking in detail. For example, a 1997 PSC from Benin states:
At the end of the Contract, in any other situation than
the abandonment case, the Contractor must take the
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measures according to the Good Practices of the Oil
Industry to restore the environment and the sites where
the Petroleum Operations have been performed to
their original state on the Effective Date of the Contract, taking into account the rules of the abandonment
procedure.99
Although this provision appears quite strict, as it suggests that sites should be restored to their “original state,” it is
weakened by the generic reference to good oilfield practices.100
According to a recent World Bank report, the absence of guidelines for what should be included in a decommissioning plan is a
pervasive problem in petroleum producing countries.101
In addition to an absence of guidelines, there are obviously
strong incentives for some companies to “cut and run” or to conduct only superficial remediation to minimize costs. One method
for ensuring that decommissioning and remediation are carried
out to plan is to use a financial mechanism such as a performance bond or reserve fund. Tanzania is an example of a country
that has set up such a regime in its 2008 Model PSC.102

Conclusion
Since Gao’s study was published in 1994,103 there have
been significant changes in the content of upstream oil and gas

contracts vis-à-vis environmental protection. The small sample
of contracts reviewed in this article indicates that a significant
number of clauses covering a variety of issues—from baseline
environmental assessments all the way through to environmental
remediation—can be found in modern contracts. Given the monumental increase in environmental awareness and the intense
scrutiny that the industry has come under in the two decades,
this is unsurprising. What is remarkable is that a handful of contracts still resemble those that Gao criticized for having only a
token mention of environmental protection, and that references
to ambiguous terms such as “good oilfield practices” remain so
pervasive.
Further research will be required to build an understanding of why there are such wide disparities in contracting practice between countries. For example, it would be interesting to
explore whether the environmental provisions in oil and gas contracts reflect domestic attention to these issues or if the capacity of the government to negotiate with IOCs is a more relevant
factor. Additionally, empirical work is required to determine the
extent to which contract clauses on environmental issues are
actually implemented by IOCs and monitored and enforced by
governments.
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Global Trade:
The Impact of Massachusetts’ Energy Policy on Columbia’s Mining Industry
by Cynthia Wildfire*

T

he United States relies heavily on the assertion that
domestic coal reserves supply the nation’s electricity
with a continuing secure energy source. The oft-cited
figure that a 150 year supply of domestic coal is available often
underlies the energy policy debate.1 While energy plan proposals
suggest reducing dependence on foreign oil, “clean coal” technology remains the focus for electricity generation.2 However,
a closer look at the types of coal available displays flaws in this
simplistic view of total reserves. Massachusetts already imports
over eighty percent of the coal used to produce the state’s electricity from other countries, primarily Columbia. 3 The results
of Massachusetts’ air quality regulations reveal how shifts in
environmental regulations can make domestic coal too expensive to compete in the market, even without serious regulation
of greenhouse gases.4 Meanwhile, importing coal adds to the
environmental and social problems of the countries that produce
it. Environmental regulations need to catch up to the globalization of markets and trade, or the air quality regulations designed
to reduce power plant emissions and acid rain in Massachusetts
may translate to polluted water and damaged land in Colombia,
rather than a net global environmental improvement.5
Coal in the United States comes primarily from Western
states, with Wyoming in the lead, and from Appalachia, the historic coal mining region.6 Because of the long history of coal
mining in Appalachia, the best and most accessible coal is gone,
making mining more expensive and the region unlikely to regain
its former market share.7 Much of the coal from the West is
closer to the surface and cheaper to mine, but has relatively low
energy content.8 It takes about fifty percent more Western coal
to produce the same amount of electricity as Appalachian coal.9
One of the benefits, however, of Western coal is that it is low in
sulfur, a key pollutant targeted by Clean Air Act regulations.10
Meanwhile, Columbia’s coal has high energy content and is low
in sulfur and ash, making it ideal for power generation under
U.S. regulations.11 Ground shipping between Wyoming and New
England is expensive, particularly given that more coal is needed
to provide the same energy output, while cheaper, high quality
coal from Colombia can be shipped on barges to New England
at lower total cost.12
Massachusetts has enacted clean air regulations for power
plants that are stricter in some ways than the Clean Air Act
regulations in place nationally.13 Power plants have the option
of retrofitting, switching to renewable or other cleaner energy
sources, or using cleaner inputs.14 Simply switching to lower
sulfur coal that produces fewer emissions is less expensive
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than either updating emissions controls or switching to a clean
energy source.15 Power plants must submit compliance plans
to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
(“DEP”), and most have chosen to comply through substitution
of cleaner coals.16 In a more globalized coal market, the United
States, and particularly Massachusetts, rely more heavily on coal
imports to obtain the best quality coal at lower prices and to continue to avoid building power plants with better emissions reduction technology.
Colombian coal has a competitive advantage in part because
shipping costs from Wyoming are so high and the Colombian
coal industry is relatively new, allowing companies to mine the
“easy” coal that has been mined out in Appalachia, but largely
because regulation in Colombia is lax compared to that in the
United States.17 In Columbia, workers have few rights and are
paid substantially less, approximately one-seventh the pay of
U.S. coal miners.18 The environmental impact of Colombian
mines, particularly degraded water quality, ensures that the
increased exports fail to improve the standard of living in coal
communities.19 Colombia boasts the world’s largest open pit
coal mine, the scale of which increases the environmental and
social problems attendant with mining.20
If Massachusetts, or any other state, truly wants to lower
emissions and improve the environment, regulations need to
mandate genuinely clean energy sources and not merely transfer the environmental costs across the globe or across sectors.
Rather than allowing utilities to meet the requirements by
switching to low-sulfur coal from South America, Massachusetts
should take a longer view approach by investing in renewable
energy sources. As long as coal continues to be used, regulations
should ensure that power plants are equipped to burn it cleanly
rather than sourcing low-sulfur coal from developing countries.
While domestic coal reserves ensure that dependence on foreign
coal will not carry the same risks and foreign policy implications as dependence on foreign oil, states should combine their
environmental policies with local energy rather than searching
farther afield to remain dependent on coal and resistant to a more
meaningful shift in energy policy.
Endnotes: Global Trade on page 40

* Cynthia Wildfire is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Washington College of Law.
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Leading While Catching Up?:
Emerging Standards for China’s Overseas Investments
by Kirk Herbertson*

I

Introduction

n February 2011, activists marched across Nairobi, Kenya
to the Chinese embassy waving banners and chanting “haki
yetu!” (our right!).1 They demanded that the Chinese government end Chinese companies’ involvement in construction
of the Gibe 3 dam, Ethiopia’s largest ever public infrastructure
project.2 The activists had previously petitioned the Chinese
government, Chinese companies, the Kenyan government, and
Ethiopian government, but received no response.3 The march
symbolized people’s frustration in being unable to communicate
with the Chinese companies involved in the project.4
The Gibe 3 dam will span across the Omo River in Ethiopia, which flows into Lake Turkana on the southern border with
Kenya.5 When completed in 2012, the dam will reduce the Omo
River’s flow by thirty percent, affecting the 500,000 local people
who depend on the lake and river for their livelihoods.6 The Lake
Turkana region is already a landscape in crisis. According to
several independent studies, the reduced water flow could lead
to food insecurity, intensify pre-existing tribal conflicts in the
area, and potentially destabilize the region near the Ethiopian,
Kenyan, and Sudanese borders.7 The Gibe 3 dam is one of five
large hydropower projects underway in Ethiopia.8 More dams
are planned as the Ethiopian government has decided to export
electricity to neighboring countries (although agreements have
not yet been reached with these countries).9 When the dam’s reservoir is filled, over 100,000 people will need to relocate to grow
crops.10 Hundreds of thousands of others may lose their livelihoods from herding, fishing, and trading.11
Many foreign investors declined to finance the project. In
2008, JPMorgan Chase decided not to underwrite the project,
and by 2010 the World Bank, African Development Bank, and
European Investment Bank also withdrew funding considerations.12 In July 2010, however, the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (“ICBC,” the world’s largest bank) agreed to
become the project’s largest lender, granting a loan of $500 million to a Chinese company to provide equipment necessary to
construct the dam.13
The Gibe 3 dam project is one example of how China’s
overseas investments have gained international media attention
in recent years. China’s decades-long growth has made it the second largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in mid-2010
and soon to eclipse the United States.14 As China’s economy
grows, so does its demand for natural resources and new markets.15 The Chinese government has shaped its foreign policy to
keep up with demand for energy and resources by encouraging
companies to “go global.”
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From a macroeconomic perspective, the results have been
impressive. Overseas investments have tapped natural resources
ranging from minerals and oil in Africa, to hydropower in Southeast Asia.16 New markets have opened for Chinese goods and
services.17 Many Chinese companies have found particularly
lucrative opportunities in impoverished, resource-rich developing countries.18 In 2010, China became Africa’s largest trading
partner.19 Yet at the same time, many people have expressed
concern about the environmental and human rights footprint of
these investments.20
This article provides a brief overview of efforts underway
to strengthen environmental and social sustainability in China’s
overseas investments. In recent years, the Chinese government
and several companies have recognized the importance of ensuring that investments are responsible, and have begun to adopt
standards that govern overseas investments. The article first provides a brief overview of China’s approach to overseas investments, using examples from Africa. The article then describes
how Western and multilateral financial institutions have traditionally played a role in promoting environmentally and socially
responsible investments, and considers whether Chinese financial institutions could play a similar role. This article will also
examine the environmental and social standards that are emerging for China’s overseas investments.

China’s Approach to Overseas Investments
In 2001, China’s tenth Five-Year Plan21 directed Chinese
companies to “go global,” as a way to gain access to natural
resources, stimulate China’s exports, and build China’s markets
abroad.22 The Chinese government, in turn, provided support
to companies, including access to finance, tax exemptions, and
insurance to lower the costs of doing business.23 As a result of
the “go global” Strategy, China’s foreign direct investment flows
increased from less than one billion dollars in 2000 to an estimated fifty-five billion dollars in the first half of 2010 alone.24
As early as 1954, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai announced
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that continue to
set the parameters for China’s approach to international development: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
(2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s

* Kirk Herbertson is an Associate at the World Resources Institute (“WRI”),
an environmental nonprofit organization based in Washington, DC. The author
wrote this paper in his personal capacity, and has drawn upon research by WRI
consultant Bruce Jenkins. Please direct comments to kherbertson@wri.org.
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internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful
coexistence.25
Based on these principles, the Chinese government has
branded Chinese overseas investment as a “new type” of strategic partnership for developing countries that differs from
Western aid and investment.26 China’s overseas investments are
closely linked to its development aid—both are important parts
of the loan packages that the Chinese government often negotiates with host governments. The Chinese government encourages “win-win” development, guarantees non-interference in
domestic affairs, and promises not to condition the receipt of
aid on governance and democratic reforms.27 Often, Chinese aid
comes in the form of infrastructure projects that are built by Chinese companies.

Natural Resource Extraction in Africa
Like many Western investments, a significant portion of
China’s investments in Africa focus on natural resource extraction. Over fifty percent of all foreign direct investment inside
Africa goes towards natural resource exploitation.28 Over one
quarter of U.S. and Chinese imports come from major African
oil exporting countries—Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria for the
United States and Angola, Sudan, and Libya for China.29 Since
2000, the number of oil companies operating in Africa (both
private and state-owned) has increased from 250 to over 800.30
Competition to exploit Africa’s natural resources is growing.31
Chinese oil companies remain relatively small players in
Africa, providing only eight percent of the combined commercial value of international oil companies’ investments in Africa.32
Due to intense competition, Chinese companies have often
invested in developing countries with weak governance systems,
political instability, and high levels of corruption.33 Many companies—both Western and Chinese—have come under criticism
for their environmental and human rights records in Africa.34 In
this sense, China’s interest in Africa’s natural resources is not
unique but often receives media attention because of its highrisk approach.

Challenges in Protecting the Environment and
Human Rights
While Chinese companies are not unique in their interest
in Africa’s natural resources, their approach often differs from
Western counterparts. This poses distinct challenges in upholding environmental and human rights protections.
Chinese aid often takes the form of turn-key projects—
financed and built entirely by Chinese companies, and then
turned over to the host government with technical assistance.
These projects focus overwhelmingly (but not always) on concrete infrastructure projects such as roads and dams.35 After the
civil war ended in Angola in 2002, for example, China was one
of the first countries to provide development assistance.36 With
Chinese support, Angola initiated over one hundred projects in
energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries,
and public works.37 Many of these projects involved construction of new infrastructure.
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The relationship between China and Angola is complex, but
several elements are revealing about the nature of China’s overseas investments:38
• The Chinese government worked directly with Angola’s
president. In 2006, the president described the relationship as “mutually advantageous,” “pragmatic,” and with
“no political preconditions.”39 Cooperation is characterized
by frequent bilateral visits of important state officials, and
signing of various agreements. In these high-level negotiations, there was little accountability to the public or efforts
to respond to public concerns.40
• Bilateral trade increased rapidly in a few years time. Crude
oil was the main Angola export to China, and imports from
China also increased—including steel, cement, autos, and
batteries.41 China was a major source of foreign direct
investment, especially through the entry of Chinese construction firms.42
• Although China received the most media attention, it was not
the only actor. Angola also had investment agreements with
India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that have increased in
volume.43 Over time, other donors have expressed a willingness to extend credit lines to Angola.44
• China’s loans to Angola were backed by oil revenue. In 2004,
China Export Import Bank pledged a two billion dollar oilbacked loan to Angola to fund reconstruction of infrastructure.45 For each project, the Chinese government proposed a
few Chinese companies.46 Repayment began as soon as the
project was completed.47 Revenue from oil was deposited in
an escrow account, from which the amount for servicing the
debt was deducted.48 The Government of Angola was then
free to use the remainder at its own discretion.49 Loans were
provided at a deeply concessional rate (LIBOR +1.5%).50
• Chinese laborers remained separate from the local population. Chinese laborers typically stayed in Angola for one
or two year contracts, often living in closed compounds
near the construction site.51 There was little contact with
Angolans.52 At the same time, a growing number of Chinese entrepreneurs entered Angola.53 Communication challenges existed due to cultural differences and language
barriers, and most businesses remained separate from local
communities.54
• Corporate social responsibility was not part of the business
plan. Chinese companies did not interact with local communities or civil society organizations, and did not discuss
environmental and human rights concerns openly.55 In general, Chinese companies did not keep local communities
informed of operations.56

Using Finance to Hold Companies
Accountable for Overseas Impacts
Civil society activists have long struggled to find ways to
hold companies accountable for the environmental and human
rights impacts of their overseas operations. Traditionally, the laws
of the United States and other major investor countries do not
apply overseas.57 One important approach, developed over the
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past two decades by activists, has been to follow the money—to
ensure that companies and governments only receive financing
for projects that are environmentally and socially responsible.58
Many, but not all companies rely on financing to pursue
large-scale overseas investments. When companies seek financing from investors, they often must prove that the investment
is likely to generate a return. This includes identifying risks to
the project’s success and demonstrating that these risks can be
mitigated.59
Increasingly, companies acknowledge that environmental
and human rights risks can harm the success of a development
project (see Box 1).60 Harm to communities can lead to protests
that block or delay construction, and can motivate governments
to alter licenses, permits, and oversight of projects. Local and
international civil society campaigns can also damage the reputations of companies and financial institutions involved, affecting share prices and the implementation of related projects.61
Box 1: Environmental and Social Risks62
When investing in developing countries, companies increasingly consider the ways that harm to the environment and
local communities can affect a project. The following are
examples of risks that can arise out of environmental and
human rights harms.
Financing risk – Financial institutions and investors may
delay their financing, require more conditions, or decide not
to participate.
Construction risk – The proponent may not be able to complete the project on time or on budget.
Operational risk – The proponent may not be able to access
necessary inputs, produce sufficient output, or sell at a sufficient price, which can disrupt operations.
Reputational risk – The project may harm the proponent’s or
financial institutions’ brand identity, which can translate into
loss of market value.
Corporate risk – Delays or interruptions to a project may
reduce the proponent’s profitability and asset values, decreasing the proponent’s stock value, lowering its credit rating, and
raising the cost of borrowing.
Host government risk – The host government may withdraw permits and licenses, commence enforcement actions,
impose civil or criminal penalties on the proponent, or tighten
requirements.
Host country political risk – Political forces in the host
country may threaten the project.
As a result, managing environmental and human rights risks
is not just goodwill, but good business. Many studies show how
safeguarding against these risks can help to manage the complex
impacts of development projects.63 For example, engaging local
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communities in the design of a project can help build community
support for the project and avoid conflict later in the project cycle.64

Environmental and Social Standards of Financial
Institutions
In response to public criticism of its involvement in controversial projects in the 1980s and 1990s—such as the Narmada
Dam in India, which displaced over 300,000 people—the World
Bank developed “safeguard” policies to help identify, avoid, and
minimize harm to people and the environment.65 These policies
require borrowing governments to follow risk mitigation procedures in order to receive Bank financing.66 Examples of these
procedures include conducting an environmental and social
impact assessment, consulting with local communities, and
restoring the livelihoods of displaced people.67
Since that time, other financial institutions have adopted
similar policies.68 The International Finance Corporation
(“IFC”)—the private sector financing arm of the World Bank
Group—developed a detailed set of environmental and social
standards in 2006.69 Over sixty private financial institutions have
adopted the IFC’s standards through the Equator Principles.70
These policies are constantly evolving. In 2011, for example, the
IFC will adopt an updated version of its standards.71
Although these standards are far from perfect and have not
always successfully prevented harmful investments from going
forward,72 they have become an important pillar of environmental and human rights protections in overseas investments.

A Role for Chinese Banks in
Sustainable Development?
Is there a role for Chinese banks to promote environmentally and socially responsible overseas investments? In the past
few years, both the Chinese government and several Chinese
financial institutions have recognized the importance of environmental and social standards.73 Efforts are now underway to
develop these standards in the Chinese context.74
China’s financial sector has the potential to play an influential role in strengthening the environmental and social performance of China’s overseas investments. Because many Chinese
companies do not raise funds in the capital markets, the majority of total capital available to Chinese industry comes from
financial institutions.75 Over the past five years, in response to
concern about the massive pollution that accompanies China’s
rapid growth, the Chinese government has begun to apply “green
credit” policies to domestic lending.76 Chinese officials have
also worked closely with international financial institutions, particularly the IFC, to build capacity of Chinese financial institutions to manage environmental and social risks.77 While still in
their early years, China’s “green credit” policy has demonstrated
measurable success.78

Government Influence Over Overseas Investments
While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese companies to “go global,” these companies are not merely arms of the
central government; many companies are encouraged to act autonomously.79 For example, many Chinese national oil companies,
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are partially owned and controlled by the government,80 but have
gained influence due to surging profits, listing on foreign stock
exchanges, and relationships with international investors.81 Significant profits from years of high oil prices have also enabled
Chinese oil companies to finance their own investments, rather
than relying solely on Chinese financial institutions.
Nevertheless, the government continues to provide financial
support to these companies to help them compete against established
international oil companies.82 In particular, Chinese banks play a
prominent role in large acquisitions and investments and in negotiations with host governments.83 As many Chinese companies interact
at least to a certain extent with Chinese banks, their influence over
environmental and social standards could continue to grow.

Key Banks in China’s Overseas Investments
Although China’s largest private and state-owned banks
often invest overseas, China’s state-owned “policy banks” are
the leading financial actors behind the “go global” strategy.84
The two primary banks that support overseas investments are
the Export Import Bank of China (“China ExIm”) and the China
Development Bank (“CDB”).85
Most major economies have “export credit agencies”
that help to finance companies exporting goods and services
abroad.86 China ExIm is one of the largest export credit agencies
in the world.87 In 2009, ExIm and CBD combined approved over
one hundred and ten billion dollars in lending.88 Founded as a
policy bank, and now a semi-private bank, China Development
Bank has also been one of the key funders of large infrastructure
and industrial projects overseas.89
As Deborah Brautigam of American University describes:
The importance of policy banks like the ExIm Bank and
China Development Bank in China’s development model
and its international economic relations cannot be emphasized too strongly. China . . . is in many ways a typical East
Asian developmental state. It acts to accelerate development
through deliberate use of state policies. The central characteristic of a developmental state is its control over finance.
This control need not be exclusive – but it must be important
at the margin in order to influence the behavior of firms in
directions determined by political leaders. In this regard, Beijing is following directly in the footsteps of the earlier Asian
successes, Japan, Korean, and Taiwan, who all used development finance to “pick winners” in the globalization race.90
In the next five years, we can expect these financial institutions to play an increasingly important role in encouraging Chinese companies towards environmentally and socially responsible
investments. In March 2011, the National Peoples’ Congress met
in Beijing to approve the next Five-Year Plan.91 At the core of this
plan are environmental protection and social equity.92

Emerging Standards in China’s
Overseas Investments
Standards are already emerging that could influence China’s
overseas investments. These include domestic policies, voluntary corporate standards, and policies designed specifically for
overseas investments.
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Domestic Policies
For several years, Chinese financial institutions have pursued “green credit” policies in their domestic lending.93 In 2003,
China adopted a stronger environmental impact assessment law
that ensures greater public participation in project decisionmaking.94 In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Agency
(now the Ministry of Environment), Peoples’ Bank of China, and
Central Banking Regulatory Commission issued a green credit
policy that requires all commercial banks to conduct environmental screening of loans, and to restrict lending to companies
with high energy consumption and pollution.95 The policy also
established a credit blacklist that prohibits banks from lending
to companies that fail to meet environmental standards. The
Chinese government followed the Green Credit Policy with a
Green Trade Policy (2007), Green Securities Policy (2008), and
a Green Insurance Policy (2008).96 In 2008, the government took
measures to increase public access to environmental information
from the government and companies.97 These experiences may
help to inform future standards for China’s overseas investments.

Voluntary Corporate Standards
In 2008, President Hu Jintao announced that companies
should establish the concept of global responsibility,
include social responsibility in their business strategy
on their own, abide by the laws in the country where
the enterprises operate and international common business practices, improve their management models, and
pursue unity of economic returns and social results.98
Encouraged by the government, some Chinese banks and
companies are taking an interest in corporate social responsibility.99 This becomes particularly relevant as Chinese banks and
companies increasingly interact on a global scale, enter foreign
stock exchanges, and market their products abroad.
In 2007, China Construction Bank was the first stateowned Chinese bank to publish a corporate social responsibility report.100 In the following year, China Development Bank,
ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China also
released their first reports.101 In 2008, Industrial Bank became
the first private Chinese bank to adopt the Equator Principles,102
a global standard for environmentally and socially responsible
project finance. Although many banks’ voluntary corporate standards focus on their domestic lending activities, this may soon
expand to overseas lending.

Overseas Lending
Traditionally, Chinese banks and companies have addressed
environmental and social risks only by complying with host countries’ laws and regulations. As companies expand their operations
in countries with weak governance and regulatory capacity, and as
other multilateral institutions improve their own standards, Chinese companies appear to be moving in a similar direction.
Slowly but steadily, environmental and social standards
are emerging for financial institutions’ overseas lending (see
Emerging Standards for Chinese overseas investment Box 2). All
financial institutions now apply the government’s Green Credit
Policy to domestic lending. In 2004, China Export Import Bank
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developed a short set of environmental guidelines for its overseas lending, and publicly disclosed revised, more robust guidelines in 2008.103 These guidelines require clients to conduct an
environmental and social impact assessment.104 China ExIm
monitors the client’s implementation of the assessment.105
In 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s think
tank, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, along
with the non-governmental Global Environmental Institute and
the University of International Business and Economics, completed draft environmental guidelines for Chinese companies
involved in aid and overseas investment.106 Several Chinese
ministries and regulatory bodies are negotiating the guidelines
and may approve them in the coming months.107 The guidelines
would require companies operating overseas to conduct environmental impact assessments, develop mitigation measures,
compensate people for environmental damage, and adhere to
international treaties signed by China and host countries.108 Chinese companies would be required to follow Chinese environmental standards if they were higher than host countries.109
Box 2: Emerging Standards for Chinese Overseas Investment
Date

Description of standards

2004

China Exim Environment Policy110
Three-paragraph policy developed in 2004 but publicly released only in April 2007.

2006

State Council’s Nine Principles on Overseas
Investment111
Developed to “encourage and standardize” companies’ overseas investment. Requires Chinese companies to comply with local laws, design contract
bidding to be transparent, protect labor rights of local
employees, protect the environment, and implement
corporate responsibilities.

2007

China Export Import Bank’s Environmental
Guidelines112
Publicly released in 2008. Governs investments
overseas. Requires companies to conduct an environmental impact assessment and to compensate communities for environmental damage.

2007

Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture by
Chinese Enterprises113
Governs the overseas practices of Chinese logging
companies. Requires preservation of high value forests and endangered species, monitoring systems,
and consultations with local communities.

2008

SASAC statement on overseas state-owned companies114
The Director of State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (which governs stateowned companies) stated that Chinese companies
going abroad must comply with international rules
and local laws.
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2008

State Council regulations on international
contracts115
A State Council regulation allows the government to
fine companies up to RMB one million for undertaking contracts without official approval. This regulation improves government supervision, protects the
rights of Chinese workers, and enhances compliance
with host country laws.

2008

National Audit Office’s new department on overseas assets116
The office announced a new department focusing on
state-owned or central-capital controlled companies
and overseas national assets. The department will
seek to uncover any potential misuse of funds, with
special attention to overseas state owned assets.

2009

Draft environmental guidelines for overseas
investment117
The Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning,
in cooperation with the Global Environmental Institute and the University of International Business and
Economics, completed draft guidelines. The Ministry
of Environmental Protection and China Banking
Regulatory Commission are negotiating the final
guidelines.

Conclusion
As Chinese banks and companies continue to expand their
overseas footprint, they will undertake more projects in environmentally and socially sensitive areas. The Chinese government’s current efforts to develop standards are an important first
step, but other changes will need to follow. As Western financial
institutions have experienced, policies on paper are meaningless
unless they change the behavior of companies abroad.
Numerous challenges remain. The implementation of any
guidelines will need buy-in and coordination across the numerous Chinese agencies involved in overseas investment. Financial
institutions will also begin to explore ways to enforce and hold
companies accountable for their environmental and social performance. Chinese companies have little experience in engaging
directly with local communities and civil society organizations,
even though direct engagement is the pillar of environmental
and human rights risk management.
Chinese banks and companies can learn from foreign companies by engaging in dialogue and trading experiences, but this
will not be enough. Ultimately, a uniquely Chinese approach
will need to develop to environmental and social risk management that is appropriate for Chinese culture, but also fully
respects the environment and human rights of local communities. In this way, the Chinese development model can truly help
to bring “mutual benefit” and “win-win” development to other
developing countries.
Endnotes: Leading While Catching up? on page 41
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Small Wind Turbines May Change the Future
of Energy in Developing Countries
by Robert Foster*

A

s alternative energy sources gain prevalence in energy
markets worldwide,1 small wind turbines have emerged
as a viable alternative to their larger and more expensive counterparts. While most attention has been drawn to their
domestic application in developed countries, and various low
cost commercial turbines are available to consumers for several
thousand dollars, they also offer great promise in electrification
of developing countries.2 However, because of the technological nature of small wind turbines, as well as the socio-political
characteristics of the regions in which their use is most applicable, special care must be taken
while developing policies to
encourage investment as well as
during implementation of construction plans. If these factors
are carefully considered, small
wind turbines may prove to be
an environmentally conscious
option for the electrification of
developing countries.
Small wind turbines differ from large turbines in many
important ways, demonstrating
their greater versatility. While
large turbines require mature
power grids, small turbines
have application both on and off
existing power grids, as a result
of their size and low energy output.3 Their off grid application avoids the heavy cost of expanding transmission lines to rural regions of developing countries.4
Additionally, small turbines operate on lower wind speeds than
large turbines, giving them more placement options.5 Experts
also indicate that small turbines, if placed correctly in suitable
locations, generate more energy per dollar than other common
alternative energy sources such as photovoltaics.6
There are three overlapping phases in which introduction
of small wind turbines must be carefully considered: investment, planning, and implementation. To encourage investment,
successful policy initiatives in developed countries may offer
effective models for developing countries. In developed countries, investment in small wind turbines usually originates at
the individual household level.7 Here, feed in tariffs (“FITs”),
which compensate individuals per kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated,8 offer an effective method to encourage investment.9

While there are numerous FIT models,10 those of Germany and
Spain, where individuals may be compensated at rates as much
as four times the rate paid to commercial power sources, have
been highly successful in encouraging installation of small-scale
renewable energy systems.11 With success and popularity, however, also comes an element of risk. Developing countries must
be mindful that if too many individuals opt into FIT programs,
operating costs could rise sharply as governmental compensation
obligations grow.12 Notwithstanding this risk, FIT programs are
the most promising way to encourage investment in alternative
energy sources in developing
countries. Any nation seriously
considering widespread implementation of a renewable energy
scheme should also consider
exemption of import tariffs on
equipment.13 Such an exemption
will lower startup costs and further encourage investment.
Rural regions of developing
countries, without established
power grids, face additional
investment considerations. As
absence of electricity often indicates lower levels of affluence,
capital will be less available
than in regions with established
power grids.14 While FITs may
provide some encouragement
for investment, the availability of credit in these regions will be
crucial for the viability of any small wind project.15 Sources of
credit include international financial institutions and countries’
development agencies, such as that of France (L’Agence Française de Développement), which extends environmental credit
lines to local banks in developing African countries.16 NGO subsidies are also a source of credit; however, their funding must be
carefully designed to create conditions under which they will no
longer be needed in order to ensure ultimate market sustainability for renewable energy.17
To break even, small wind projects require approximately
ten to twenty years before the initial cost can be recovered.18 If
connection to an outside established grid is likely, and in-place

While FITs may provide
some encouragement
for investment, the
availability of credit in
these regions will be
crucial for the viability of
any small wind project
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FIT payments are not high enough, then a project’s economic
feasibility could potentially be undermined by a sudden influx of
cheaper electricity. Under this scenario, individual, community,
and institutional investors would never recover their construction
and maintenance costs, as the market rate for electricity would
now be too low.19 For this reason, it is imperative that investment
in small wind turbines be incentivized in regions of developing
countries where connection to an established grid is not expected
during the ten to twenty year cost-recovery period.
Once a developing country has created investment incentives,
planning and implementation are the next steps for successful
introduction of small wind turbines. According to the Center of
Excellence for Renewable Energy, there are six critical factors at
this stage of development: management, local training capacity,
technical support, viability of the energy source, ownership, and
political interference.20 Dealing with these issues firsthand, Practical Action, an international charity based out of the UK whose goal
is to combat poverty through the use of technology, has introduced
small wind turbines to isolated villages in Sri Lanka and Peru.21
Before choosing project locations, Practical Action assessed the
demand for electricity, paying close attention to use patterns.22
Ultimately, the distinguishing factor that made wind power in

Sri Lanka more feasible than Peru was the existing demand for
electricity.23 However, to forecast energy demand purely based on
current energy demand would be shortsighted; potential demand
should be comparably weighted.24 In making such determinations,
relevant factors include population size, level of infrastructure,
and number of viable financial institutions.25
Investment in human capital is the final and perhaps most
critical aspect in implementing any small wind project.26 The
construction, operation, and maintenance of small wind turbines require a high degree of technical understanding.27 For
implementation to be successful, the local population must have
proper training and knowledge.28 Community involvement is
pivotal, as without a sense of ownership, local populations will
have no sense of commitment to their small wind turbines and
these turbines could easily fall into disrepair.29
Community involvement, in addition to investment incentives, comprehensive planning, and adequate technical training,
is just one critical factor that determines the ultimate success of
any small wind turbine project. If these factors are carefully considered, small wind turbines offer promise towards electrification of developing nations in a way that is both environmentally
conscious and sustainable.
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A Legal View on Border Tax Adjustments
and Climate Change:
A Latin American Perspective*
by Valentina Durán Medina and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo**
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Introduction

he General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)
as amended by the Uruguay Round Amendments, which
created the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), contains
rules on Border Tax Adjustments (“BTAs”).1 No single section
of this agreement deals exclusively with BTAs; however, rules
addressing BTAs can be found throughout, namely in Articles
II, III, and XVI.2
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (“OECD”) Working Party, BTAs are “any
fiscal measures that put into effect the destination principle in
whole or in part.”3 In other words, BTAs relieve exported products of some or all of the tax the exporting country charged on
similar domestic products in the home market and enables the
importing country to charge some or all of the tax on imported
products that it charges on similar domestic products. The term
“border tax adjustment” is somewhat confusing because it suggests that a fiscal measure is applied at the border, which is not
always the case.4 Although in many cases imports are taxed on
entry, certain countries apply a tax to imports after the goods
have crossed the border and have been sold to other merchants or
consumers. Moreover, the OCED has noted that certain tax systems do not tax exports at all and make no adjustment at the border.5 Considering these varying tax systems, the OECD Working
Party has recommended the replacement of the term “border tax
adjustments” with “tax adjustments applied to goods entering
into international trade.”6
The OECD’s careful treatment of BTAs illustrates that they
are not a novel concept to international trade. However, BTAs
have only recently been considered as an innovative policy
option for addressing the challenges of climate change. The concept of climate change BTAs is as follows: carbon-taxing countries would levy import fees on goods that non-carbon-taxing
countries manufacture. The motivating factor for these measures
is—at least in theory—to internalize the real costs of producing
goods and services with respect to international climate change
regulation, thereby leveling the playing field between producers
of like products from different countries.7
A BTA would tax imported goods the equivalent of what the
producers would have had to pay to produce them in the home
market they are entering. Under this system, domestic producers in countries with carbon taxes will not face costly climate
change measures that foreign producers do not face in their
home countries. An alternative approach would be to impose
29

taxes on imported goods that are equivalent to the enforcement
of emissions allowance trading.8 Therefore, in order to import
products from a nation that does not comply with the carbon
taxes applied in the importing country, an importer of goods
would be required to purchase emission rights in his home country, compensating for the difference.9
Some commentators have mentioned that these measures
should be called Border Carbon Adjustment (“BCA”), because
“requirements to buy into domestic cap-and-trade schemes are
more like regulations than taxes.”10 However, while recognizing
BCA as a more precise concept, considering BTAs have usually
been proposed to address climate change in the form of taxes, we
will continue using the term BTA. This article will first provide a
background on climate change and multilateral efforts to resolve
the problem. It will then move on to a discussion of the potential
treatment of BTAs under WTO law. Finally, we will discuss the
implications of this analysis in Latin America with a focus on
Chile.

Climate Change Background
and Multilateral Efforts
Climate change is a widely recognized, global problem
caused by humans, and the time for action is now; current trends
indicate that we will likely arrive at a point of no return between
2015 and 2020.11 Commentators note that the cost of taking
measures now is much less expensive than waiting until 2020 or
2030.12 Climate change is regulated by a multilateral treaty and
protocol in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).13 Even if measures
to address climate change are both multilateral and domestic, the
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perspective from Latin America, and especially from Chile, is
that environmental issues and global problems should be treated
multilaterally.14
The official position of the Government of Chile’s foreign
policy, unchanged in recent decades, is “to contribute to the
strengthening of multilateralism.”15 In this sense, Chile aims to
strengthen the climate regime in the United Nations. The Chilean
government officially promotes the joint action of nations on the
global agenda in areas such as security threats, natural resources,
energy, environment, sustainable development, climate change,
international violations, poverty, and governance.16
In the context of multilateral solutions, Border Tax Adjustments seem to be a unilateral answer to the problem of climate
change. BTAs can be politically feasible for the adoption of
national regulations in countries like the United States, but they
are seen as a threat to the international trading system and could
potentially violate international trade law under the WTO.
Resolving this potential conflict between climate change
mitigation measures and international trade law is of paramount
importance. Since the early nineties, multilateral environmental
agreements, soft law instruments, and the OECD have encouraged the use of a broad range of instruments, and especially
the use of market-based instruments, to reduce environmental
impacts.17 States are increasingly employing economic instruments, such as taxes and charges, as instruments of environmental policy-making to address inputs and production processes.18
Even though no Border Tax Adjustments have been implemented yet, the United States and the European Union have
considered the possibility of imposing BTAs ever since the Climate Conference held in Copenhagen on December 2009 failed
to produce a global deal to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions.19

European Union
BTAs have been a subject of debate in the European Union
since 2006 when the EU’s High Level Group (“HLG”) on Competitiveness, Energy, and Environment advised the European
Commission to analyze the viability of all potential policy measures, including border tax adjustments, that could encourage
EU trading partners to decrease GHG emissions, so as to reduce
climate change risks and the impact of a carbon premium on
European competitiveness.20 However, consensus to implement
BTAs has not been reached and European heads of state remain
divided on the subject. In December 2006, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson pointed out that:
[A] specific “climate” tariff on countries that have
not ratified Kyoto . . . would be highly problematic
under current [WTO] rules, and almost impossible to
implement in practice. [D]eveloping countries are not
required to make specific emissions cuts under the
Kyoto Protocol; also . . . some U.S. states have ambitious climate policies. 21
John Hontelez, Secretary General of the European Environmental Bureau22 affirmed that:
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[BTAs] might be the answer which allows the EU to
develop responsible climate policies without having
to wait for other countries. They would result in products imported from the US being taxed to compensate
for resulting differences in production costs. Thus EU
firms would be protected against unfair, carbon-careless competition from outside.23
In 2006, then French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin suggested that countries that do not join a post-2012 international treaty on climate change should face extra tariffs on their
industrial exports.24 De Villepin argued that “[c]ountries like the
U.S. and China . . . should not be allowed to benefit from efforts
to reduce climate change without having to shoulder some of the
costs or suffer from any related loss in competitiveness.”25 Subsequent reports of the HLG do not reach the subject of Border
Tax Adjustments and instead called for other measures as international action on climate change.26

United States
The relationship between the U.S. and the international climate change regime has been controversial. As the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution of 1997 asserts, the United States should not sign or
agree to any convention or protocol on any subject matter containing new commitments to limit or reduce GHGs unless it also
mandates developing countries to do the same, or that “would
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.”27
It has been reported that some sectors of U.S. “industry have
lobbied hard for climate legislation to include border measures,
citing competitiveness concerns, the need to encourage large
developing country emitters to adopt binding emissions targets,
and fears of ‘carbon leakage’”—the relocation of firms to countries with fewer carbon restrictions, increasing global emissions
or leaving them unaffected.28
In this context, in June 2008 the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act29 was introduced in the U.S. Congress with
the intention of establishing measures to reduce GHGs, including a cap-and-trade program and a measure requiring certain
importers to submit special allowances.30 Rather than impose a
Border Tax Adjustment, this bill would have required importers
of GHG-intensive products from other countries without comparable GHG reduction schemes to buy international credits or
other emission certificates from the federal government or from
a U.S. regulatory program.31
The same year, another bill, The Climate Market Auction
Trust and Trade Emissions Reduction System Act of 2008 (“Climate Matters Act of 2008”), included measures to reduce GHGs
emissions, including offering developing WTO participant countries “access to the carbon market . . . includ[ing] additional
incentives such as the ability to choose the base year or maximum level of allowable greenhouse gas emissions for its emissions trading system, rather than requiring it to match the [U.S.]
system.”32 This measure targeted the large emerging economies
and gave exceptions to: “least developed countries” and “countries that generate less than [five percent] of global emissions.”33
Moreover, the income of the BTA “would be used to offset the
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negative effects of climate change in developing countries (e.g.,
through technology transfer).”34
On June 26, 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009 (“ACES”) was approved by the House of Representatives by a narrow 219-212 margin.35 Although the bill never
passed the Senate, it aimed to reduce emissions with a graduated schedule through 2050 by calling for extra import charges
on goods from countries that do not cap greenhouse gas emissions.36 President Barack Obama considers ACES’s border tax
adjustments clauses to be tariffs penalizing goods from countries that are not actively limiting GHG emissions, and criticism
has arisen due to concerns of protectionism and because the bill
appears to make tariff penalties the rule.37 Obama recognized
a legitimate concern that American businesses not be disadvantaged by higher energy costs, but emphasized that various forms
of transitional assistance for energy-intensive industries already
existed without the need for “a tariff approach.”38
All U.S. legislative proposals have two common features:
they exempt goods from border tax adjustments if imported
from countries with minimum GHG emissions, and apply BTAs
to “primary products” with high GHG emission levels during
their production process, such as: iron, steel, aluminum, cement,
glass, paper and pulp, chemicals, and industrial ceramics. 39
ACES also covers any “manufactured item for consumption”
that generates “a substantial quantity of greenhouse gas emissions.”40 These policies specifically target developing countries
like China, Brazil, and India that are considered large emitters
of GHGs because most developed countries already have emissions reduction plans and exports from smaller countries would
be excluded by the legislation as they emit less than 0.5% of
global emissions.41 Nevertheless, because of their drafting, these
measures could easily affect other developing countries if they
increase their GHG emissions, even if overall they contribute
minimally in the context of global emissions, as we will explain
later.

Border Tax Adjustments and the WTO
As we will see, economists and lawyers in the field of both
international trade and environmental law have discussed the
legality of BTA measures under WTO law. However, up to now
neither BTAs nor climate change policies have been challenged
under the WTO dispute settlement system. Commentators have
opined that a case regarding a BTA before the WTO would be
difficult and controversial for lack of precedent at the WTO and
before the international climate regime.42 Indeed, even the Kyoto
Protocol provides in Article 2.3 that parties included in Annex I
“shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade,
and social, environmental, and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties.”43
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol list various policies and measures by which industrialized countries can achieve
emission limitations, including tax and duty exemptions and
subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors.44 Nevertheless,
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the protocol lacks specificity because it does not offer concrete
steps or targets to achieve those policies and measures. Due to
this lack of specificity, it is difficult to claim jurisdiction over
such behavior and to authorize a body or mechanism to address
it. As a consequence, policies and measures are not included in
the UN climate regime’s compliance system and dispute settlement procedure.45
It is not clear that the Kyoto Protocol’s permissive rules
on policies and measures are in conflict with WTO law, either
directly or indirectly, and some commentators believe that
properly designed BTAs could meet WTO rules, yet others disagree.46 Discussions revolve around the legality of BTAs under
the international trade system, the relation between BTAs and
subsidies, the difficulty of assessing or calculating BTAs, and
the justification of such measures under climate change regime.

BTAs are Permissible Under WTO Law
BTAs are explicitly allowed by the GATT as long as the
tax imposed on imported goods is no greater than the tax established for similar domestic products.47 It has been noted that
“the GATT does not impose any requirement that nations adopt
a tax base that can be administered without double taxation, in
fact or in principle. For example, countries can impose a BTA on
imports without any corresponding rebate for exports.”48
However, it is still uncertain whether BTAs can be used
for taxable inputs that are not physically incorporated
into the final traded product. For instance, it is not clear
if an import tax could vary based on the amount of carbon dioxide emitted during a good’s production—WTO
rules would have to be interpreted in a way that considers products not to be “like” each other based on their
carbon footprints.49
The latter would be true only if this factor could be considered a “relevant comparator.”50 To do so would require advancing the argument that any product which emits one ton of carbon
is a “like product” akin to any other product which emits one ton
of carbon. 51
Some commentators assert that BTAs “raise the costs of
imported products based on the amount of greenhouse gases
emitted occurring abroad during the manufacturing of each product. In international trade, this type of regulation is a process and
production method (“PPM”) measure and cannot be used to distinguish between like products.”52 Therefore, the argument goes,
“BTAs on environmental taxes embodied in pollution-intensive
traded goods are or should be barred when the tax is on emissions or a polluting input rather than the good itself.”53
The non-adopted report of the GATT Tuna-Dolphin Panel
was the origin of the process/product distinction:
under the national treatment principle of Article III,
contracting parties may apply border tax adjustments
with regard to those taxes that are borne by products,
but not for domestic taxes not directly levied on products (such as income taxes). . . . The Panel considered
that it would be inconsistent to limit the application
of this Note to taxes that are born by products while
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

permitting its application to regulations not applied to
the product as such.54
However, like the Tuna-Dolphin decision itself, neither the
GATT contracting parties nor the WTO have ever adopted the
process/product approach. Several scholars “have observed that
the process/product distinction itself was rooted in a misunderstanding by the panel of the GATT rules governing BTAs.”55
Moreover, from a historical point of view, “it was the intent of
the original GATT negotiators that process as well as product
charges be border adjustable.”56
In addition, further GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement
decisions have moved away from the process/product approach
and have since considered other methods for determining what
“like product” is. Some of those consider the motivation for a
government’s product categorization in determining its legitimacy, including the Japan Alcohol Panel Report (1987),57 the
U.S. Alcohol case,58 and the U.S. Taxes on Automobiles Report.59
This approach is potentially much more sensitive to environmental policy goals like climate change. We must also keep in mind
that according to Article III, Section V of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),
“measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral
ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”60
Even if a BTA were permitted and properly assessed, it
would still need to overcome other legal trade hurdles. Once
found to be covered by GATT Article III, the BTA must also
meet the substantive test in that provision, which requires that
imported products not be treated less favorably than like domestic products (“national treatment”).61 In addition, the BTA must
avoid discrimination between imports from different countries,
as required by the “most-favored nation” obligation of GATT
Article I.62 For some authors, a unilaterally imposed BTA
on imported goods would most likely go against WTO rules,
whereas using national treatment and most-favored nation principles63 prevents different treatment of foreign products vis-àvis domestic like products.64
Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to what would happen
with a cap-and-trade system and whether “the obligation to hold
emission credits or allowances up to one’s actual level of carbon
emissions be qualified as an ‘internal tax or other internal charge
of any kind’ which, under GATT Article III:2, can be imposed
also on imports.”65

Not Imposing BTAs is Equivalent to a Subsidy
One of the most famous scholars to advocate BTAs is
Joseph Stiglitz who affirmed that “[n]ot paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full
costs of workers would be.”66 According to Stiglitz, “in most of
the developed countries of the world today, corporations are paying the cost of polluting the global environment, in the form of
taxes imposed on coal, oil, and gas.”67 However, American firms
are being massively subsidized because of the relative lack of
this taxation in the U.S. He proposes a remedy:

Spring 2011

[O]ther countries should prohibit the importation of
American goods produced using energy intensive
technologies, or, at the very least, impose a high tax
on them, to offset the subsidy that those goods currently are receiving . . . [T]he United States itself has
recognized this principle. It prohibited the importation
of Thai shrimp that caused unnecessary deaths of large
numbers of endangered species . . . [and] the WTO sustained the important principle that global environmental concerns trump narrow commercial interests . . . .
[I]f one can justify restricting importation of shrimp .
. . to protect turtles, certainly one can justify restricting importation of goods produced by technologies that
unnecessarily pollute our atmosphere.68
The EU also considers not applying BTAs as a potential illegal subsidy that causes two major problems:
The first is the competitiveness of energy-intensive
industries in the EU vis-à-vis competing industries in
jurisdictions without similar environmental restrictions. Normally, a foreign producer that operates at
lower costs is simply more competitive and should . .
. be able to out-compete its domestic rival. But when
lower costs result from the lack of environmental costs,
the advantage is artificial . . . . The second potential
problem is “carbon leakage,” which means that any
domestic carbon reduction would be offset in the global
environmental commons by an increase in carbon emissions elsewhere.69
But what happens if we apply this solution to developing
countries? Should we not consider the principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibility? This principle is one of the cornerstones of sustainable development, emerging in the context
of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and underpinning the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol.70 However for developing countries,71
Stiglitz suggests something different: a common (global) environmental tax on emissions that addresses their social cost.72
But, should we consider the absence of emission cuts a subsidy or a carbon tax? It is clearly not a subsidy in a traditional
sense, but as some commentators have pointed out:
The problem is not that the Chinese government is
paying Chinese producers or is otherwise transferring
funds; rather, the problem is that the government fails
to act, that is, it fails to impose and collect a carbon tax
or to otherwise force Chinese producers to internalize
the full cost of carbon emitted in China.73
Thus, even if not imposing a carbon tax or not requiring
producers to internalize the cost of carbon could be qualified as
a “subsidy” under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, countervailing duties to offset subsidies by
foreign governments can only be levied in the case of a particular subsidy74 to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises
or industries.”75
A further question arises if “carbon credits” would be considered a subsidy if they are distributed for free. What would
happen if, using the cap-and-trade system, domestic producers
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who face competition from competitors who manufacture in
countries without GHG laws were given free credits? This proposal would most likely provide a subsidy to the industry in
comparison to other domestic industries and could potentially
violate trade law, but this conclusion is arguable.

BTAs are Difficult to Assess or Calculate
We have seen that BTAs could be used to “level the playing
field between taxed domestic manufacturers and untaxed foreign
competitors.”76 Under GATT Articles II and III, WTO members
may impose “internal charges” on imported goods.77 Nevertheless, while internal charges can be relatively easy to identify, “it
is difficult to assess the quantity of carbon emissions resulting
from the production of a particular good. Could carbon taxes or
higher energy costs linked to a cap-and-trade system qualify for
a similar adjustment?”78
Another key question is whether it is even possible to establish a trade appropriate BTA. A true BTA would tax the actual
GHG emissions resulting from manufacture, which seems nearly
impossible to quantify. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether a
BTA could be administered in a way that is truly free trade neutral, or if due to its administrative difficulty it would inevitably
be a trade barrier.
Proposed BTAs are generally based on the average additional cost of the GHG law and raise the following pertinent
question under WTO law: if a general tax on carbon emissions
is imposed based on the local corporation’s actual carbon emissions (so a low emissions factory pays less), and an international
company with the same low emissions pays the industry average,
would this be legal under WTO rules?

BTAs Can Be Justified to Prevent Climate Change
Even if BTAs conflict with international trade law, they
might still be legal if justifiable under GATT Article XX,79
which specifies the conditions under which State Members can
be exempted from WTO general rules. Two of these enumerated
exemptions could be relevant in the case of BTAs: if doing so is
necessary “to protect human, animal, or plant life or health,”80 or
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”81
In addition, we must keep in mind that the introductory paragraph (“Chapeau”) of Article XX allows such measures as long
as they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade.”82 Such an exemption would most likely
“center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT
Article XX, a [BTA] . . . is applied on a variable scale that takes
account of local conditions in foreign countries, including their
own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic
development in developing countries.”83 Therefore, a government “would also have to show that the measure is being applied
squarely to avoid ‘leakage,’ rather than to offset competitive concerns.”84 Additionally, to qualify as an exception under Article
XX, the BTA would also have to be the least trade restrictive
measure.85
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A recent article also claims that BTAs “will only survive
a WTO challenge if they successfully invoke one of the GATT
Article XX environmental exceptions,” which would be difficult
because BTAs are designed with the principle intent of maintaining economic competitiveness.86 In contrast, if a BTA based
on a domestic carbon tax neither discriminates against imports
as compared to domestic products nor as compared to other
imported goods, it might be permissible without resorting to the
exemptions embodied in GATT Article XX.87

Border Tax Adjustments and Developing
Countries: Latin America’s Case
Some “targeted” countries of future BTAs have expressed
their opposition to these measures, most notably China88 and
India.89 However, for the most part, Latin America has not presented either support or opposition for BTAs. In analyzing why
this may be the case, it is first important to examine the contribution of Latin American countries to global GHG production and
the exports from Latin America on which BTAs could be applied
in the future. Chile is presented as a case study.
In 2004, Chilean emissions were only 0.2% of total global
emissions.90 However, while the annual per capita emission level
of 3.9 tons of CO2 per inhabitant is very modest compared to
developed nations, Chile is second in total GHG emissions in
South America only to Venezuela,91 and has emissions similar
to Portugal when it undertook its Kyoto reduction obligations.92
Furthermore, the economy of Chile is becoming more and
more dependent on coal. University of Chile studies show that
by 2030 electric generation in Chile will be sixty percent dependent on coal. That means that CO2 emissions may grow from
14.2 to 85 million tons of CO2 between 2006 and 2030 and that
emission per capita may grow from 3.6 tons of CO2 in 2005 to
13.8 tons by 2030, more than China and OECD countries.93 On
March 1, 2011, the Central Castilla coal-fired power plant of the
Atacama region,94 the largest coal-fired power plant in South
America, was approved by the Chilean impact assessment system (“SEIA”). The day after, SEIA approved a project aimed at
extracting coal to be sold to coal-power plants. These developments have generated public concern and controversy.95
Directly related to BTAs is the question of the carbon footprint of exported products. This was conceptualized as a way to
internalize climate costs generated by the production and transportation of products. Studies have shown that Kyoto Protocol
Annex I countries are net importers of carbon and that developing countries are carbon exporters.96
Chile has begun to measure the carbon footprint of its main
products, particularly exported ones. But in the end, the question is how deep the carbon footprint of each of those products
and sectors is, and ultimately: are the countries, which receive
Chilean exports, going to adopt a BTA that affects Chilean
products? Copper mining, which accounts for the largest portion of exports, is energy intensive. Chile has become an OECD
member,97 and the OECD recommended that Chile increase its
application of the polluter pays principle (“PPP”) in the Chilean economy.98 The WTO recommends implementing this PPP
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through measures such as a carbon tax and tradable permits.
International trade rules require Chile to assume the cost of
the “carbonization” of its economy or to accept the cost of lost
competitiveness.99

Conclusion
At first glance, BTAs appear to have the potential to reduce
global GHG emissions, but there are some important caveats to
consider: a) BTAs are unilateral in a world of multilateral climate
change regimes;100 b) BTAs could be used against developing
countries, reversing the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility; c) the permissibility of BTAs under the GATT
depends on the legal interpretation of the relevant international
treaties, colored by political and administrative concerns; d)
BTAs most likely would not fit under WTO law, because it is
unlikely that they would be the least trade restrictive measure;
and e) if BTAs are feasible they will most likely be difficult to
administer or enforce.
Independent from considerations of protectionism and
transparency, BTAs could be a threat to Latin America through
the pressure from foreign markets, in this case pushing towards
a low carbon economy. Other such pressure is embodied in the
October 2009 Loi Grenelle 2 in France, which states that after
January 2011, food imports will be regulated for carbon footprints, and that for French exports GHG emissions must be
reported and included in labeling.101
If a carbon BTA could be perfectly designed and administered, theoretically there would be no effect on the share of
exports to the country imposing the BTA. It would still be almost
equally as profitable to export to that country, and would just
be more expensive to buy the goods within the country (from
either domestic or international suppliers). Some demand would
shift from the carbon heavy items to cheaper, carbon-light items,
but an ideal BTA should not have a large effect on the export
economy of the developing country. A perfectly designed system
could have neutral pressure on the economy of Chile and other
countries. However, the issue is whether or not such an ideal
BTA could be unilaterally imposed.

For a BTA to be effective, accurate calculation of carbon
footprints would be necessary. Moreover, considering the PPP
and the Common but Differentiated Responsibility principle,
the main question relates to who must pay the costs of carbon
produced by production and transportation: the consumer or
producer? In a competitive world economy, if the price of an
input is raised uniformly, the end product must rise or else the
producing firms would find a better use for their capital and stop
making the product. It seems that making a producer pay for the
carbon directly is an administratively easier way to differentiate between production methods. These pressures, expressed by
unilateral measures that should be avoided to address ecological problems, could mean that mitigation obligations might pass
from developed to developing countries, reversing the Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities principle.
Noting the passing of mitigation obligations in the unilateral application of BTAs, former Chilean President Lagos, Special UN Commissioner for Climate Change, proposed that, in
addition to Chile’s conformity with unilateral requirements for
exporting to the United States or France, exporters to developing countries should equally consider the transportation costs of
their goods, and the transportation of those goods.102
However, from an environmental perspective, Chile should
support BTAs because without them some high carbon industries might relocate to Chile, increasing the carbon footprint
per capita disproportionately faster than would otherwise occur
without carbon taxes in the developed countries. In early 2011,
the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres,
warned the Americas have become “fossilized,” rather than using
renewable energy, and mentioned that Chile has already reached
levels of emissions of gases typical of European countries.103
Where does the responsibility for the increased carbon footprint
in Chile lie? Should it be considered the responsibility of Chile,
or that of the countries that induced industries to relocate unnecessarily? As this problem demonstrates, any truly sustainable
application of BTAs will require a multilateral approach, taking
into consideration the complex interactions between the many
participants in the global trading system.
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